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THE RISE OF AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM IN ISRAEL
Rafi Reznik*
ABSTRACT
The American fascination with the link between interpretive methodology and political ideology
rarely reaches beyond its borders. This Article offers a comparative case study, which converses
with the American example—Israel. A twofold argument is offered to facilitate this conversation.
First, the Article identifies a shift in the ideological climate of the Supreme Court of Israel,
manifested in the rise of a new interpretive method. For the first time, the interpretive theory
prevailing in Israel, Purposive Interpretation, faces a viable competitor. The Article unpacks the
challenges posed by the new theory, termed Purposive Originalism, in methodology as well as
underlying understanding of democratic principles. While Purposive Interpretation is conceptually
and historically tied to American liberal theories, Purposive Originalism deeply resonates
American conservatism, espousing variations on its three basic tenets: originalism, bright-line
rules, and deference. Second, the Article contends that this development should be understood as
part of a broader ideological reorientation of the political right-wing in Israel, toward American
conservatism. Increasingly drawing on the philosophies and strategies of its American counterpart,
the Israeli Right has adopted the compound of social traditionalism, neo-liberal economic policy,
and hawkish national security stance, as well as discontent with the administrative state,
synthesized under the headline of conservatism. An interpretive methodology that strives for the
same values enshrined in this political project fulfills a vital role in its success. Such a convergence
of judicial and political reinterpretations of conservatism marks an Israeli recreation of the
dynamics that emerged in the U.S. in the 1980s, with an all-encompassing conservative backlash
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against legal liberalism. The Israeli case thus reveals how American conservatism can be, and is
indeed, incorporated into different cultural and constitutional settings.
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INTRODUCTION

Two overarching phenomena permeate high-stakes
constitutional adjudication in the United States: one is the formation
of two opposing ideological camps; the other is a fierce debate over
interpretive methodology. The existence of both phenomena is widely
recognized yet the nature of their relationship remains contested. The
late Justice Scalia, for example, took pride in his adherence to a
particular interpretive method, on the one hand; and willingly
identified as a conservative, on the other hand—yet denied any
connection between the two.1 Judges who are widely considered liberal
tend to favor distinctly different interpretive methods, but similarly
resist attaching to them any particular ideological label.2 While it seems
to have escaped the bench, observers of the judiciary have nonetheless
recognized that there are quite overwhelming overlaps between
“conservative” judges and “originalist”/“textualist” ones, and between
“liberal” judges and “living constitutionalist”/“purposivist” ones.3

1
Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 849, 851 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)). On Scalia’s selfidentification as a “social conservative,” see Ian Samuel, The Counter-Clerks of Justice
Scalia, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 2 (2016).
2
See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW
AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 277–78 (2016) (arguing that while being
“inevitably the lawyer I am” influences his interpretation, personal views are still “a
different concept” from either politics or ideology); Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Becoming
‘Notorious,’
NEWSHOUR,
Oct.
10,
2016,
available
at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YSEWCA2Hhmo (upon being described as a
liberal, Justice Ginsburg responded: “The label ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ [ . . . ] What
do those labels mean? It depends on whose ox is being gored;’” see also infra notes
125–126 and accompanying text (on liberalism and conservatism as contested
concepts)).
3
The most famous exception is probably Justice Kennedy: a conservative
who employed evolutionary interpretivism. This was most notable in the LGBT
rights decisions he authored for the Court—Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071
(2015); U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003)—yet apparent already at his nomination hearing. Morton J. Horwitz, The Bork
Nomination and American Constitutional History, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1037–39
(1988).
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Notwithstanding its American idiosyncrasies, such an
interpretation-ideology nexus can also manifest elsewhere. This Article
offers a novel comparative case study: Israel.
For decades, Israeli judges have been employing one
interpretive method only, called Purposive Interpretation (“PI”),
which pertains to all legal materials. By U.S. standards, PI is a liberal
theory of interpretation. This Article argues that there is a new method
on the rise in the Israeli Supreme Court, hereby termed Purposive
Originalism (“PO”). It is further argued that this interpretive
development also signifies a shift in the Court’s political climate, calling
to mind its American counterpart. For it is not only a conservative
method, but more specifically, one that deeply resonates American
conservatism.4 Moreover, the backlash against legal liberalism in Israel is
not confined to the judiciary, but is rather heralded by the political
sphere, where a project of assimilating American conservatism has
been underway for a longer period of time. Viewed under this light, it
becomes clear that the current historical moment in Israel resembles
in important respects the 1980s in the United States.
By comparing these two moments of convergence between
political and interpretive formulations of conservatism—the American
and the Israeli—this Article aims to make a threefold contribution to
comparative law literature.
First, the Israeli Supreme Court is in a stage of transition,
which may have significant and long-lasting ramifications for Israeli
law. The Article develops a framework toward understating this
doctrinal development in interpretive methodology as fulfilling a vital
role in the evolution of conservative ideology. The American
experience provides a useful vocabulary, although by no means
sufficient, for processing this potential paradigmatic shift and
constructing a discourse around it. Specifically, it sheds light on a
crucial yet neglected element of American-Israeli relations: how the
inspiration Israeli law draws from the U.S., and the inspiration Israeli

4

The framework of American conservatism is explicated at infra section

III.A.
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politics draw from the U.S.—two phenomena that have been studied
separately—are related.
Second, at a time when American scholarship is recognizing
that not as much hinges on interpretive methodology as is often
assumed,5 in Israel the recognition that the outcomes of highly
contentious cases can and do hinge on the method by which meaning
is extracted from text, is only now beginning to take shape. This
moment of jurisprudential castling between the two systems may
broaden the interpretive vocabularies of both and enrich their
interpretive discourses.
Finally, from a broader comparative perspective, this Article
promotes a deeper appreciation of how interpretive methods function
within broader political projects. The Israeli example enriches and
challenges recent studies on non-American originalism,6 by presenting
a case that expressly echoes the historical American experience.
Despite cultural and historical differences, Israeli originalism assumes
similar political colors as American originalism, and is similarly
accompanied by a blooming conservative power outside of the judicial
sphere. The Article thus joins the growing recognition that
comparative inquiries cannot be divorced from cultural-genealogical
processes.7 At the same time, it suggests that it is precisely a
comparative investigation that can best elucidate the essential
components of a legal phenomenon, including in its original
manifestation. Case in point: conservative interpretation.
The argument is divided into two parts, as follows. Part II
focuses on the interpretive debate unfolding in the Supreme Court of
Israel. It opens with a description of the prevailing theory of
interpretation in the Israeli judiciary, Purposive Interpretation, and
5
Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 305 (2010).
6
See Jorge M. Farinacci Fernós, Originalism in Puerto Rico: Original Explication
and Its Relation with Clear Text, Broad Purpose and Progressive Policy, 85 REV. JUR. U.P.R.
203 (2016); Kerri A. Froc, Is Originalism Bad for Women? The Curious Case of Canada’s
“Equal Rights Amendment,” 19 REV. CONST. STUD. 237 (2015); Yvonne Tew,
Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 780 (2014).
7
See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, Negative Comparative Law, 10(2) J. COMP. L. 405
(2015).
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explains its connection to American legal liberalism (section II.A.). It
is then argued that PI is currently being challenged by a new method,
Purposive Originalism. Section II.B. delineates the details of PO and
explains how they counter legal liberalism. Part III situates this
development in the realm of American conservatism and its
Israelization. First, it explores American conservatism as a
comprehensive political agenda (section III.A.1.). Next, it shifts to
conservative adjudication as an enterprise that strives to realize the
same values, both instrumentally and intrinsically, via interpretive
methods (section III.A.2.). Finally, the Article brings these discussions
together. Section III.B. is the heart of this Article. It argues that PO is
not only a conservative method of interpretation, but a component in
an emerging movement of American conservatism assimilated into the
Israeli context. This assimilation is apparent in the ideologies and
strategies espoused by political, judicial, and civil society forces. These
forces are linked together ex ante, in the process of selecting the judges
to join the bench, and ex post, in the adjudicative potential to further
the goals of conservative policymaking. The discussion proceeds in the
following order: interpretive methodology (section III.B.1.); judicial
appointments (section III.B.2.); the political sphere (section III.B.3.);
judicial outcomes (section III.B.4.).
II. THE RISE OF PURPOSIVE ORIGINALISM IN ISRAEL
As far as countries halfway around the world go, the United
States and Israel have a very close relationship, ranging across various
public spheres—politics, civil society, intellectual life. The legal sphere
is no exception, and the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court has extensively influenced its Israeli counterpart, particularly in
constitutional contexts.8 However, the American debate surrounding
8
See Hadar Aviram, Bad Role Models? American Influence on Israeli Criminal Justice
Policy,
J.
INT’L
&
COMP.
L.
(forthcoming),
available
at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3404281; MENACHEM MAUTNER, LIBERALISM IN
ISRAEL: ITS HISTORY, PROBLEMS, AND FUTURES 380 (2019) [HEBREW]; SUZIE
NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTION OF ISRAEL: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 243 (2014)
[hereinafter NAVOT 2014]; Tamar Hostovsky Brandes, Human Dignity as a Central
Pillar in Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence in Israel: Definitions and Parameters, in ISRAELI
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 267, 275 (Gideon Sapir, Daphne BarakErez & Aharon Barak eds., 2013); Yoram Rabin & Arnon Gutfeld, Marbury v.
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interpretive methodology has been absent from the Israeli judicial
climate. Grounded in the exceptional, perhaps sacred or fetishistic
status of the U.S. Constitution in American public discourse, the
originalist/living constitution debate is unique.9 Generally, judicial
disagreements in other common law jurisdiction do not revolve around
interpretive methodology, and even when interpretive debates ensue,
with varying degrees of U.S. influence, they do not take center stage as
polarizing issues.10 Accordingly, for decades Israeli judges have been
using one method only for interpreting constitutional and statutory
texts.11

Madison and Its Impact on Israeli Constitutional Law, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 303 (2007); Pnina Lahav, American Influence on Israel’s Jurisprudence of Free Speech,
9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 21 (1981). The relationship is not reciprocal, though; on
the reluctance of U.S. courts to turn to foreign law, see BREYER, supra note 2.
9
RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 147 (2014); Jamal Greene, On the Origins of
Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2009); AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A
DEMOCRACY 133–35 (2006).
10
Kim Lane Scheppele, Jack Balkin is an American, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
23 (2013); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Constitutional Interpretation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 689 (Michel Rosenfeld &
András Sajó eds., 2012). For similar discussions in other jurisdictions, see Noam
Kolt, Cosmopolitan Originalism: Revisiting the Role of International Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 41 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 182 (2017); Lael K. Weis, What
Comparativism Tells Us about Originalism, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 842 (2013) (Australia);
Leonid Sirota & Benjamin Oliphant, Originalist Reasoning in Canadian Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 50 U.B.C. L. REV. 505 (2017); Noura Karazivan, Constitutional Structure
and Original Intent: Canadian Perspective, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 (Canada); E. Kofi
Abotsi, Purposive Originalism in the Supreme Court: Interpretive Methodology and Problems of
Certainty, 26 U. GHANA L.J. 173 (2013) (Ghana); Yvonne Tew, Comparative Originalism
in Constitutional Interpretation in Asia, 29 SING. ACAD. L.J. 719 (2017) (Hong Kong,
India, Malaysia, Singapore); Stephen Brittain, The Case for an Originalist Approach to
Constitutional Interpretation in Ireland, 13 TRINITY C.L. REV. 71 (2010) (Ireland); Fernós,
supra note 6 (Puerto Rico); Gretchen Carpenter, Constitutional Interpretation by the
Existing Judiciary in South Africa: Can New Wine be Successfully Decanted into Old Bottles?,
28 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 322 (1995) (South Africa); Ozan O. Varol, The Origins
and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1239 (2011)
(Turkey).
11
Certain judges may have taken liberties in the application of PI, but none
have overtly challenged it in public law contexts. Contracts are the major site of
interpretive contestation in Israel, with a school favoring a textual over a purposive
approach. See DANIEL FRIEDMANN, THE PURSE AND THE SWORD: THE TRIALS OF
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The lack of an interpretive debate makes sense in the Israeli
context due to its constitutional history and culture. 12 In a nutshell,
Israel has no full-fledged constitution, owing to the inability to reach
wide political consensus at the state’s founding in 1948. 13 Instead, it
has ‘Basic Laws’ that were enacted sporadically by the Knesset (Israeli
parliament), on a ‘chapter-by-chapter’ basis. Absent any special
constitutional codification, these laws were not traditionally considered
as equivalent of a formal constitution.14 Fourteen Basic Laws have
been enacted to date, the majority of which design the operation of
government institutions. Two of the Basic Laws, both enacted in 1992,
protect human rights and hence constitute Israel’s ‘Bill of Rights:’ Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation. Both include a similar ‘limitation clause’ that renders a
regular law invalid if it violates enumerated rights, except when
“befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper
purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required.”15 However,
ISRAEL’S LEGAL REVOLUTION 186–88 (Haim Watzman trans., 2016). Still, ultimately
some model of PI is applied to contracts as well. Jonathan Yovel & Ido Shacham,
Israeli Contract Law: An Overview, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT MANUAL
(2014), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1139775, at 10; SHIMON SHETREET &
WALTER HOMOLKA, JEWISH AND ISRAELI LAW – AN INTRODUCTION 534 (2017).
12
Some Israeli scholars deny any room for comparison between the
American interpretive debate and Israeli law. Gideon Sapir, Living Originalism—The
Jewish Version, 7 JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD. 49, 51 (2013); Iddo Porat, The Use of Foreign
Law in Israeli Constitutional Adjudication, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
MAKING, supra note 8, at 151, 158. For a different view, according to which some
aspects of Israeli jurisprudence make for a paradigmatic case of originalism, see
Hassan Jabareen, The Paradigm of Originalism: Israeli Constitutional Law and Legal Thought,
52 ISR. L. REV. 427 (2019) (reviewing ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
MAKING, supra note 8).
13
See HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED
SOCIETIES 53–75 (2011).
14
Menachem Mautner, Protection of Liberal Rights Amidst a “War of Cultures”
(Kulturkampf) between Secular and Religious Groups, 48 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 125, 130–40
(2018); LERNER, supra note 13, at 75–82; GIDEON SAPIR, THE ISRAELI
CONSTITUTION: FROM EVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION 18–29 (2018); NAVOT 2014,
supra note 8, at 31.
15
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, § 8, English translation available
at https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm; Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation, § 4, English translation available at
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic4_eng.htm. See NAVOT 2014,
supra note 8, at 25–46.
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neither these nor any other Basic Law explicitly authorize judicial
invalidation of contradictory statutes. In a landmark decision from
1995,16 the Supreme Court asserted the authority to strike down
statutes that unlawfully infringe on constitutional rights, and the Basic
Laws were thus recognized as having superior normative status. This
only pertains to statutes enacted after the human rights Basic Laws,
since in addition to the limitation clauses they also contain ‘savings
clauses,’ protecting the validity of statutes already on the books. The
Court has nonetheless ruled that all statutes, new or old, shall be
interpreted in the light of the Basic Laws, so as to accommodate rather
than conflict with them as far as the statutory language allows. 17 The
enactment of the human rights Basic Laws, along with the Court’s
declaration that they enjoy constitutional normative status and
empower it to conduct judicial review of regular statutes, is termed
‘The Constitutional Revolution.’18

16
CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 1
IsrLR
(1995),
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\9
3\210\068\z01&fileName=93068210_z01.txt&type=4.
17
The savings clause included in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
(§ 10) is absolute, while the one in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (§ 10) was
limited in time and expired in 2002, stating that until that point conflicting provisions
shall be interpreted “in the spirit” of the Basic Law. See Rivka Weill, Bills of Rights with
Strings Attached: Protecting Death Penalty, Slavery, Discriminatory Religious Practices and the
Past from Judicial Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE: RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY
INSTITUTIONS 308 (Rosalind Dixon et al. eds., 2018). In 2017, Justice Anat Baron
insinuated, in a concurring opinion denying the recognition of same-sex marriages
performed in Israel (as any other form of civil marriage), that there may come a day
when the normative force of the savings clause in the Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty “will not suffice to block constitutional processes.” HCJ 7339/15
Aguda—Israel’s LGBT Task Force v. Ministry of Interior (Aug. 31, 2017), ¶ 3
(Baron,
J.,
concurring),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
5\390\073\t06&fileName=15073390.t06&type=4. For criticism of this opinion, see
SAPIR, supra note 14, at 69–70.
18
The term was coined by then-President of the Court, Aharon Barak, in
reference to the enactment of the human rights Basic Laws, in United Mizrahi Bank,
supra note 16. It is now commonly used to address the judicial decision as well, or to
the judicial decision alone. See SAPIR, supra note 14, at 49–58; LERNER, supra note 13,
at 78–82.
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The contrast between this constitutional framework and the
American one is stark. As opposed to the canonical status of the U.S.
Constitution in the nation’s culture—legal or otherwise—neither the
Israeli Basic Laws nor the people who enacted them enjoy any such
public recognition; far from it. In fact, a not uncommon view holds
that members of Knesset (“MKs”) were “deceived” into voting,
unaware of its consequences. Some of them would later decry it,
claiming they had never imagined it would result in a judicial authority
to strike down statutes, and had they known they would have acted
differently.19 The ostensible lack of explicit will to enact a formal
constitution coupled with the recency of the human rights Basic Laws,
obviate the empirical inclination to search for original intentions,
understandings, or meanings. It also calls into question the doctrinal
legitimacy to do so, and generates no such public expectation.
Accordingly, the interpretive method prevailing in the Israeli judiciary,
PI, is emphatically purposive.20
A. Purposive Interpretation
Neither the Basic Laws nor any other statute detail the method
by which judges should interpret the law.21 PI was developed by
SAPIR, supra note 14, at 38–48. Still, these laws have not been repealed.
Furthermore, both human rights Basic Laws were amended in 1994 by a large
majority, and at a time when the argument that they authorize judicial review was
undoubtedly on the table, and the limitation clauses were left intact. Adam Shinar,
Accidental Constitutionalism: The Political Foundations and Implications of Constitution-Making
in Israel, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 207, 214
n.13 (Denis Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013); Jabareen, supra note 12, at 444.
20
Margit Cohn, Comparative Public Law Research in Israel: A Gaze Westwards, 14
ASIAN J. COMP. L. S11, S22 (2019) (“Israel’s non-textualist legal tradition has been
supported by the absence of a full written constitution”).
21
A few specific interpretive principles appear in legislation, such as the rule
of lenity (Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 34U [כא34], English translation available at
https://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/antibriberyconvention/43289694.pdf) and gender neutrality (Interpretation Law, 5741–
1981,
§
6,
35
LSI
370
(1980–81)
(Isr.),
available
at
https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law150/laws%20of%20the%20state%20of%20i
srael-35.pdf). It is also stated that statutory gaps should be filled by appealing to
precedent, analogy, or “in the light of the principles of freedom, justice, equity and
peace of Jewish Law and Israel’s heritage” (Foundations of Law, 5740–1980, § 1, 34
LSI
181
(1979–80)
(Isr.),
available
at
19
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Aharon Barak, the most influential jurist in Israeli history.22
Throughout his tenure as a Supreme Court Justice (1978–2006) and
President of the Court (equivalent to Chief Justice, 1995–2006), Barak,
a former law professor, continued to produce a voluminous body of
scholarship. His main focus in the 1980s–1990s was developing a
comprehensive theory of judicial interpretation, simultaneously
implemented in the Court’s jurisprudence.23 PI encompasses all legal
texts, and it has been adopted by the Israeli judiciary completely, such
that it is the only method Israeli judges apply when interpreting
constitutional and statutory texts.24
The starting point of PI is that the language of the text sets the
boundaries of its interpretation, and a judge cannot give the words a
meaning they cannot bear.25 This is a feature of virtually any theory of
judicial interpretation, and PI belongs in the group of theories
https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law150/laws%20of%20the%20state%20of%20i
srael-34.pdf (the term “Jewish Law” was added in a 2018 amendment. See Aviram,
supra note 8, 6 n.34). See generally SHETREET & HOMOLKA, supra note 11, at 49–50;
NAVOT 2014, supra note 8, at 58–63.
22
See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, You Shall Appoint for Yourself Judges, JEWISH REV.
BOOKS (Summer 2018), https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/3230/youshall-appoint-for-yourself-judges (reviewing FRIEDMANN, supra note 11) (“Towering
over Israeli law of the past several decades is the singular figure of Aharon Barak”);
FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 198 (“Barak became something of a super-chief justice,
with power far greater than that wielded by any of his predecessors”).
23
For a critique of the way Barak single-handedly reshaped the Israeli legal
canon by “self-canonization,” see Roei Amit, Position(ing) of a Canon, 21 TEL AVIV U.
L. REV. [IYUNEI MISHPAT] 81, 89 (1998) [Hebrew].
24
Nir Kedar, Interpretive Revolution: The Rise of Purposive Interpretation in Israeli
Law, 26 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. [IYUNEI MISHPAT] 737, 737–39 (2003) [Hebrew]; Rafi
Reznik, Toward an Interpretive Debate in Israel, 12 HEBREW U. L. REV. ONLINE
[MISHPATIM
AL
ATAR]
67,
67–68
(2018)
[Hebrew],
https://lawjournal.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/2019-01/mishpatimonline-12067.pdf [Hebrew]. Until the 1980s, there was no uniform interpretive method in
Israel, and judges applied the interpretive framework inherited, like the law itself,
from the British Mandate: an oscillation between textual and intentional approaches
supplemented by common law canons. Kedar, supra, at 741; FRIEDMANN, supra note
11, at 19–21; Gad Barzilai & Ilan Peleg, Engineering the Law and Justice Deconstruction:
Ideologies of Knowledge in Law and Politics in Israel and Beyond, 4 J. COMP. L. 205, 209–12
(2009); ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN, JUDGES OF THE LAND: THE ORIGIN AND
CHARACTER OF THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT 192–200 (1980) [Hebrew].
25
AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 102–03 (2005).
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instructing judges to conduct this examination broadly, as a mere first
step.26 For it wishes to leave significant room for purposive
considerations, which consist of three methodological stages:
subjective purpose, objective purpose, and ultimate purpose. Barak
stipulates that the unique aspect of his PI is the last one, which “tries
to synthesize and integrate” the former two,27 rather than categorically
choosing one over the other, in order to give the text the best possible
interpretation in light of its purpose.
Subjective purpose is the subjective intent of the legal text’s
author, at the time the text was created. It is an empirical, historical
fact.28 The primary source for determining the subjective purpose is
internal—the language of the text. From the text, the judge “in a
reverse process” attempts to identify the author’s will as to the
purposes they wished to realize at the time.29 Sources accorded equal
validity but lesser evidential weight are those external to the text: “the
totality of circumstances related to its creation,”30 primarily legislative
history. The “golden presumption” is that the subjective purpose arises
in its entirety from the text’s “ordinary and natural language.”31
The next, or rather parallel stage is the objective purpose. This is
the intent of the reasonable author, or at a higher level of abstraction
“the intent of the system.”32 It is not an empirical matter, but rather “a
legal construction that reflects the needs of society.”33 The objective
purpose is not fixed in time, it is in synch with the “fundamental
values” of the system and hence dynamic and determined at the time
of interpretation.34 The primary source for determining the objective
purpose is once again the text in its entirety. Plenty of external sources
are also pertinent, including nearby texts; case law; comparative law;
This is one of several Dworkinian aspects of the theory. See Ronald A.
Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FL. L. REV. 165, 171 (1982); infra notes 43–
57 and accompanying text.
27
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 182.
28
Id. at 120.
29
Id. at 135.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 144.
32
Id. at 148.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 154.
26
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“general social and historical background;” and the fundamental values
of the system.35 In discerning the objective purpose, the interpreter
uses what Barak calls “purposive presumptions,” designed to promote
and integrate these fundamental values. For example, it is presumed
that an individual objective purpose (the solution in a given statute to
a specific social problem), does not contradict the general objective
purpose (advancing democratic-constitutional principles), unless so
stated in clear, explicit, and unequivocal language. 36
The final stage of PI is determining the ultimate purpose of the
text. Judges presume that both the subjective and the objective
purposes are reflected in the text’s language, and seek to reconcile
them: “they do whatever they can to reduce conflict” and achieve
synthesis and integration of the author’s will and the system’s will. 37
This means that from all of the optional subjective purposes, the judge
should choose the ones that accommodate the objective, and vice
versa, so that conflict is avoided altogether. In cases of unavoidable
clash, PI offers broad, discretionary guidelines rather than a simple
formula. They take the form of continuums, along which the
interpreted text needs to be situated.38 Barak lists the following
continuums. The legal character of the text: the more public,
collectively authored the text—from wills through contracts to statutes
and constitutions39—the more weight is accorded to the objective
purpose.40 The age of the text: the subjective purpose is weightier when
the text is recent. The scope of the issue: the objective element
strengthens when the issue under regulation is more comprehensive.
The character of the regime: when a transition of fundamental values
occurs, the objective purpose is given more weight. Specificity: rules
invite a more subjective consideration than standards. And content-

Id. at 159–64.
Id. at 173–81, 256.
37
Id. at 183.
38
Id. at 182–206.
39
Administrative texts are notably absent from Barak’s scheme (similarly to
Dworkin. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016)). Such texts are still interpreted using PI, with
necessary adjustments. Baruch Bracha, Constitutional Upgrading of Human Rights in
Israel: The Impact on Administrative Law, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581 (2001).
40
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 132–35.
35
36
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specific considerations: for example, in criminal matters more weight
is assigned to the objective purpose than in civil issues. PI takes all of
these factors into account and chooses among them via the
methodological principle of balance, a term frequently used by Barak.
In balancing the scales, “[p]urposive interpreters look at the life of the
text from its conception (and eve before that) until the moment of
interpretation.”41
PI sees judicial interpretation as a normative, teleological
process that unapologetically leaves significant room for discretion,
while insisting on objectivity and rationality. The basic tenets of PI are
summed up by Barak with the words “language, purpose, discretion.”42
In American terms, Israeli law employs a pluralistic
methodology, under a conception of all legal texts (to varying degrees)
as “living documents.”43 This should be of no surprise. For in both the
theory’s doctrinal details and in its historical background, the
intellectual orbit in which PI is situated is that of American legal
liberalism. Espousing both liberalism and legalism, this intellectual
movement is characterized by faith in the potential of courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, to advance social reform and expand
the scope of civil rights while maintaining judicial integrity.44 Legal
liberals were students of the movement’s academic precursor, the
Legal Process school.45 Barak is no exception, having studied under
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks at Harvard Law School in the 1960s. 46

Id. at 183.
Id. at 268.
43
See Barak Medina, “Foundational” Originalism? On Jack Balkin’s Living
Originalism, 7 JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (2013). For Barak’s explicit rejection
of American conservative jurisprudence, see BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION,
supra note 25, at 284–85.
44
See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2,
42–46 (1996); Horwitz, Bork Nomination, supra note 3. See also Emma Kaufman, The
New Legal Liberalism, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 195–98 (2019) (book review).
45
KALMAN, supra note 44, at 50.
46
See Pnina Lahav, American Moment[s]: When, How and Why Did Israeli Law
Faculties Come to Resemble Elite U.S. Law Schools?, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 653, 657
(2009); Kedar, supra note 24, at 759. For Barak’s recognition of Legal Process’s
41
42
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The judicial epitome of legal liberalism was the Warren Court,47
where teleological interpretivism served as a cardinal tool in the
advancement of a progressive agenda, viewing the Constitution as “not
static [ . . . it] must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”48 Sympathetic
to the political orientation of the Warren Court yet concerned with the
absence of objective adjudicatory standards, Legal Process elevated the
role of procedural and institutional rationality.49 It thus hoped to
reconcile the realist insight that law, including when made by courts, is
a tool for the promotion of good social policy, with the subsequent
concern for democratic legitimacy captured by the countermajoritarian difficulty. Legal Process aspired to separate law from
politics by emphasizing the rational social purpose that each legal text
pursues, to be discerned by the democratic institution that enjoys
proper competence, reason, and expertise. Legal Process thus enabled
legal liberalism to also be liberal legalism, viz. an ontological and
normative insistence on objective legal categories, whose moral
orientation is grounded in the integrity of the democratic process.
Building on the Legal Process theories while shifting the
intellectual focus to judicial interpretation, legal liberals such as Ronald
Dworkin, Owen Fiss, and Bruce Ackerman positioned courts at the
forefront of the protection of rights. The democratic legitimacy of this
position is derived from the courts’ ability to generate legal doctrines
influence on his interpretive approach, see BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION,
supra note 25, at 227–28.
47
1953–1969. There is scholarly debate over whether the Burger Court
(1969–1986) should be considered liberal (see, e.g., KALMAN, supra note 44, at 57),
conservative (see, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER
COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT (2017)), or as a transitional phase
from the former to the latter (see, e.g., HERMAN SCHWARTZ, RIGHT WING JUSTICE:
THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO TAKE OVER THE COURTS 42–47 (2004)).
48
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C. J.) (referring to the
Eighth Amendment).
49
For an overview of Legal Process, see KALMAN, supra note 44, at 19–47;
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 2031 (1994). For core Legal Process texts, see HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds., 1994); LON
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
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out of the best possible interpretation of the Constitution, which is the
ultimate expression of collective morality. In lieu of Legal Process’s
“morality of function,”50 legal liberalism argues that the Constitution
demands the interpreter who gives meaning to its words to load them
with substantive values of political morality. Merging the interpretive
turn and the historic turn in jurisprudence, legal liberalism engaged in
a “conversation between generations.”51
Barak’s PI draws on Legal Process and on legal liberalism,
holding the courts to be a liberal-democratic institution endowed with
hermeneutic-teleological expertise.52 To illustrate, per PI,
“interpretation is not just discovery. It is also creation. The question is
what creation is best,”53 and “law is a device. It is designed to achieve
the social aim that lies at the core of the legal system.”54 Barak
incorporates liberal principles into the definition of democracy,55 and
believes in judicial ability to give a legal utterance the most charitable
meaning possible, based on the collective moral vision encapsulated in
core legal texts.56 The result is judicial legitimacy to uncover the
fundamental values of the system and to identify the legal rights they
demand to protect.57
PI is used in all Israeli courts, and is not a matter of
controversy, within or outside the judiciary. To be clear, there is in
Israel a fierce ongoing public debate, and specific criticism of Barak,
relating to judicial activism and the growing involvement of the Court

KALMAN, supra note 44, at 30.
Id. at 143.
52
See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a
Jurisprudence of Toggling between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 905 (2013).
53
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 218.
54
Id. at 221.
55
Kedar, supra note 24, at 760; BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra
note 25, at 235–36; infra note 178.
56
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 296. For Barak’s
divergences from Dworkin, see id. at 296–97, 384–85.
57
As summarized by Emma Kaufman, supra note 44, at 198: “the idea that
constitutional rights trump other rights, and do so because they reflect the most
valuable public values, is at the heart of legal liberalism.”
50
51
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in political questions since the 1980s. 58 But PI is not the target of the
critics’ arrows, and outside of legal circles the term has very little
resonance. Instead of contestation over the method by which texts are
given meaning, the discontent manifests in animosity toward
discretion-conferring judicial mechanisms implemented by the Barak
Court, particularly minimal threshold standards for justiciability and
standing,59 and open-ended standards for administrative and statutory
review, such as reasonableness and proportionality. 60 It would not be
an overstatement to say that as a strictly interpretive theory, rather than
a general adjudicative framework, PI has met with more serious
engagement in U.S. academia than in Israeli legal circles.61 Enter Justice
Noam Sohlberg.

See Mautner, Protection of Liberal Rights, supra note 14, at 143–48;
FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 184 and passim; SAPIR, supra note 14, at 29 and passim.
It is another question whether the narrative presented by such critics, according to
which the Israeli Supreme Court is an exceedingly activist one, is accurate. For
analyses more sympathetic to Barak, see Joseph H. H. Weiler & Doreen Lustig,
Foreword: A Good Place in the Middle: The Israeli Constitutional Revolution from a Global and
Comparative Perspective, 38 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. [IYUNEI MISHPAT] 419 (2016)
[Hebrew]; Yigal Mersel, On Aharon Barak’s Activist Image, 47 TULSA L. REV. 339
(2011); Barak Medina, Four Myths of Judicial Review: A Response to Richard Posner’s Critique
of Aharon Barak’s Judicial Activism, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1 (2007),
http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/HILJOnline_49_Medina.pdf.
59
FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 55.
60
See Alon Harel, Skeptical Reflections on Justice Aharon Barak’s Optimism, 39
ISR. L. REV. 261, 263 n.5 (2006) (reviewing BARAK, THE JUDGE, supra note 9).
61
For American engagements with Barak, see Frank I. Michelman, Israel’s
“Constitutional Revolution”: A Thought from Political Liberalism, 19 THEORETICAL INQ. L.
745 (2018); OWEN FISS, PILLARS OF JUSTICE 175–86 (2017); SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 1, at 481 (listing publications by Barak as sources “that we consulted and
that influenced us”); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Personae, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 433,
435 n.10; Sanford Levinson, To What Extent is Judicial Intervention against Torture a
“Hollow Hope”? Reflections on the Israeli and American Judicial Experiences since 2001, 47
TULSA L. REV. 363 (2011); KENT GREENAWALT, LEGAL INTERPRETATION:
PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES AND PRIVATE TEXTS 329–36 (2010);
Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive
Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109 (2008); Richard A. Posner, Enlightened
Despot,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(Apr.
23,
2007),
https://newrepublic.com/article/60919/enlightened-despot (reviewing BARAK,
THE JUDGE, supra note 9); Robert Bork, Barak’s Rule, 27 AZURE 125 (2007)
58
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B. Purposive Originalism
In a series of dissents and concurrences starting in 2016, 62
Israeli Supreme Court Justice Noam Sohlberg has diverged from PI to
form a theory of a distinct, coherent internal logic. Although, unlike
Barak, Sohlberg has yet to offer a comprehensive articulation of his
theory out of context,63 an inductive analysis reveals there is a
competing interpretive method in the works. I have detailed the nuts
and bolts of this inductive process elsewhere;64 here my focus is on the
political content of the emerging theory, and hence brief descriptions
of the three main opinions will suffice, followed by an explication of
the interpretive schema to which they give rise. Thus far, PO has been
concerned with statutory interpretation.
In Gini v. The Chief Rabbinate, Justice Sohlberg opined, in
dissent, that restaurants may not display signs attesting to their keeping
(reviewing BARAK, THE JUDGE, supra note 9). For criticism of this orientation, see
Ginsburg, supra note 22 (“Friedmann pithily captures the sentiment when he asks
just who Barak’s primary audience was: the Israeli public or a bunch of professors at
Yale Law School, where Barak teaches each year”). For non-American perspectives
on Barak, see Daphne Barak-Erez, Judicial Conversations and Comparative Law: The Case
of Non-Hegemonic Countries, 47 TULSA L. REV. 405 (2011); THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
AHARON BARAK: VIEWS FROM EUROPE (Maartje de Visser & Willem Witteveen eds.,
2010).
62
HCJ 6494/14 Gini v. Chief Rabbinate of Israel (June 6, 2016), available at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
4\940\064\o11&fileName=14064940_o11.txt&type=4 [Hebrew] [hereinafter Gini
I]. This case was decided by a standard panel of three, and following a decision by
the President of the Court was reevaluated by an extended panel (including the
original three judges), in a “further hearing” procedure. HCJFH 5026/16 Gini v.
Chief Rabbinate of Israel, (Sept. 12, 2017), ¶¶ 18-27 (Naor, President), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/16/260/050/c16/16050260.c16.pdf
[Hebrew]
[hereinafter Gini II]; a brief summary of the case in English is available at Uzi
Vogelman et al., Israel: The State of Liberal Democracy, in 2017 GLOBAL REVIEW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151, 155 (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2018).
63
In 2020, Justice Sohlberg took a first step in this direction. Noam
Sohlberg, On Subjective Values and Objective Judges, 18 HASHILOACH 37 (2020), available
at https://hashiloach.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/hashiloach-18print.pdf
[Hebrew].
64
Rafi Reznik, Purposive Originalism: The Rise of American Conservatism
in Israel (Dec., 2018) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, New York University) (on file with
author); Reznik, supra note 24.
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of Kosher standards unless issued by the Chief Rabbinate, a state
agency that employs rabbis who supervise food establishments.65 The
statutory provision under interpretation provides that “the owner of a
food establishment shall not present it in writing as Kosher, unless
given a Kosher certificate,”66 a document only rabbis of the Chief
Rabbinate are authorized to provide.67 The majority ruled, in a 5:2
decision, that as long as said signs do not use the word Kosher they are
not Kosher certificates, and hence may be displayed even if issued by
others. For the law does not forbid to truthfully detail the standards of
food preparation and serving restaurants keep. This interpretation was
chosen as best realizing the legislative purpose: to prevent consumer
fraud. Justice Sohlberg, following an extensive foray into legislative
history, concluded that the legislature intended to create a monopoly
over “Kosher representations,” aiming to limit the “space for fraud
and deceit of consumers” by keeping an institutional standard upheld
exclusively by the Chief Rabbinate.68 Conversely, the objective purpose
was found to favor the result reached by the majority, which minimizes
the infringement on the constitutional rights to freedom of occupation
of restaurant owners, autonomy of consumers, and freedom of religion
of both groups.69 In this clash between the subjective and objective
purposes, Sohlberg concluded that the former prevails. The reasoning

See generally SUZIE NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 213–
15 (2007) [hereinafter NAVOT 2007]. On Kosher regulation in the U.S., see Shayna
M. Sigman, Kosher Without Law: The Role of Nonlegal Sanctions in Overcoming Fraud Within
the Kosher Food Industry, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509 (2004); Mark A. Berman, Kosher
Fraud Statutes and the Establishment Clause: Are They Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 1 (1992).
66
Kashrut (Prohibition of Deceit) Law, 5743–1983, § 3(a), 37 LSI 147 (1982–
83)
(Isr.),
available
at
https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law150/laws%20of%20the%20state%20of%20i
srael-37.pdf.
67
Id. § 2(a)(1).
68
Gini I, supra note 62, ¶¶ 45–48 (Sohlberg, J.).
69
Id. ¶¶ 51–52 (Sohlberg, J.). Freedom of occupation enjoys constitutional
status thanks to its enumeration in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.
Consumer autonomy and freedom of religion are not explicitly mentioned in the
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, but have been derived by the Court from
the constitutional right to dignity enumerated therein. Hostovsky Brandes, supra note
8, at 269; NAVOT 2007, supra note 65, at 211–12.
65
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offered was that the legislature’s original intent trumps when it is clear,
and when the infringement on rights is not substantial.70
The second major exposition of PO was another state and
religion ‘hot potato,’ Association of Merchants v. The Minister of Interior.71
Dissenting again, Sohlberg maintained that municipalities lack
authority to allow supermarkets in certain areas to open for business
on Saturdays, due to a provision in the statute regulating work hours,
which reads: “in days of rest [ . . . ] a shop owner shall not conduct
business.”72 The majority, in a 5:2 decision, interpreted the provision
in tandem with a neighboring one, forbidding the employment of
salary employees in days of rest—except when certain exceptions are
granted73—concluding that the objects of regulation are the people
operating the business, in contrast to the business itself. This
interpretation furthers statutory harmony and realizes underlying
purposes of the legal system by facilitating effective use of local
government statutes, delegating discretion to regulate certain matters,
including the operation of businesses on the Sabbath, to the authority
most attentive to the needs of the affected communities. 74 Sohlberg
did not dispute that the majority’s interpretation may be anchored in
the statutory language. However, turning again to an array of legislative
history material, he found that the legislature’s intent was to force a
unitary day of rest, Saturday, in the entire market. The only exception

Gini I, supra note 62, ¶¶ 54, 68 (Sohlberg, J.).
HCJFH 3660/17 Association of Merchants and Independents v. Minister
of
Interior
(Oct.
26,
2017),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
7\600\036\c20&fileName=17036600.C20&type=4 [Hebrew], English translation
available
at
https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/General%20As
sociation%20of%20Merchants%20and%20SelfEmployed%20Persons%20v.%20Minister%20of%20Interior.pdf.
72
Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711–1951, § 9A(a), English translation
available
at
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/36146/81476/F15848673
01/ISR36146.pdf.
73
Id. § 9.
74
Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶¶ 25–32 (Naor, President);
Municipalities Ordinance (New Version), §§ 249(20), 249(21). On local government
law in Israel in general, see NAVOT 2007, supra note 65, at 180–85.
70
71
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is the operation of entertainment venues, which were excluded as a
political compromise.75
The latest substantial installment in Justice Sohlberg’s
alternative method is Rom v. The State of Israel, a case dealing with the
Ministry of Health’s decision to forbid private, unlicensed “natural
birth centers” from offering childbirth services.76 The interpretive
question was whether the statute mandating that institutions providing
“medical treatment” obtain a hospital license, extends to delivering
babies.77 Concurring in judgment, in a 2:1 decision, Sohlberg answered
in the affirmative.78 The dissent voiced concerns about women’s right
to choose how to give birth, as “closely associated with the autonomy
of every woman over her body,”79 an objective purpose that ought to
be weighty. Sohlberg found irrelevant these “ethical and medical views
about the nature of giving birth.”80 Consequently, he held that the
balance reached by the state, between “personal autonomy and

75
Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶¶ 28–33 (Sohlberg, J.,
dissenting).
76
HCJ 5428/17 Rom v. State of Israel (June 18, 2018), available at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
7\280\054\j07&fileName=17054280.J07&type=4 [Hebrew]. Just like Gini (supra
note 62), Rom too proved to be an extremely contentious decision, such that the
current President of the Court, Justice Esther Hayut, ordered a “further hearing”
procedure. HCJFH 5120/18 Women for Freedom of Choice in Childbirth v. State
of Israel (hearing yet to be scheduled; last checked May 26, 2020). Association of
Merchant was a further hearing as well, but the interpretive issues only arose in its
second installment and so the decision to rehear the case had turned wholly on the
substance.
77
Public Health Ordinance, 1940, §§ 24A(1), 24(b).
78
Rom, supra note 76, ¶¶ 8–9 (Sohlberg, J., concurring). There was no
examination of legislative history nor could there have been, since the ordinance in
question dates back to the British Mandate and was not enacted by the Israeli
legislature. Possibly for this reason, Sohlberg’s analysis did not include an explicit
contrast of subjective and objective purposes (the judge who wrote the principal
opinion, Justice Elron, grounded his conclusion entirely in an administrative rather
than interpretive examination).
79
Id. ¶ 34 (Grosskopf, J., dissenting).
80
Id. ¶ 10 (Sohlberg, J., concurring).

403

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:2

paternalistic considerations regarding public health and welfare,”
warrants no judicial intervention.81
Now, zooming out from these decisions to their bigger
meaning. Sohlberg framed his disagreement with the prevailing theory
as “not just about the question of what is the interpretation of the law;
the root of the dispute is deeper, and it is entrenched in the question
of the way in which the law should be interpreted.”82 This challenge
was met in each of the three cases with reiterations of PI principles, in
attempts to counter Sohlberg’s defiance. In Gini, his colleagues
conjured up the American interpretive debate—then an
unprecedented move in the Court’s history, and now already one of
several83—comparing Sohlberg’s approach to originalism. This may be
perplexing to the American reader, since the new theory elevates the
role of legislative history, a liberal staple in the U.S. In order to explain
why the intuition is, while crudely articulated, nonetheless correct, a
deeper dive is necessary—into the methodological details as well as the
values they express. Beginning with the former, PO poses fundamental
challenges at each stage of the PI schema. Let us flesh them out one
by one.
Subjective Purpose: Justice Sohlberg’s theory does not dispute that
language sets the boundaries for interpretation, even though, at least
rhetorically, he favors a more limited textual space. 84 Within these
Id. ¶ 12 (Sohlberg, J., concurring).
Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶ 2 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting)
(emphases in the original).
83
Infra notes 284, 293–302 and accompanying text.
84
HCJ 6301/18 Poznansky-Katz v. Minister of Justice (Dec. 27, 2018), ¶¶
3–5
(Sohlberg,
J.),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
8\010\063\m16&fileName=18063010.M16&type=4 [Hebrew] (Justice Sohlberg’s
opinion ostensibly rests on the linguistic inability to read the term “temporary
expulsion” into the term “removal from office”—and hence the disciplinary court
for judges was not authorized to impose the former on a judge who had performed
ethical misconduct. Yet Sohlberg’s reasoning was not strictly semantic, incorporating
intentionalism already into the textual phase: “the legislature considered the issue and
debated it. If he wanted to distinguish between ‘removal from office’ and ‘expulsion
from office,’ he could have done so, like he did in other pieces of legislation. It is not
neglect or mistake that led the legislature to choose this language, but conscious
intention, and we are not free to read into the words what is not in them”).
81
82
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boundaries, the ‘golden presumption’ that Barak’s PI uses for
determining subjective purpose, is that the author’s will is fully
expressed in the text.85 This presumption can be rebutted if external
sources indicate a conflicting will with greater reliability. 86 This is no
longer the case with Sohlberg’s PO, which shifts the burden of
proof—from the legislative history to the language. Legislative history
should be given “a significant, and to my mind even conclusive,
weight,”87 depending on the level of its reliability in reflecting the
legislature’s intent. Instead of presuming that the text exhausts the
author’s intent unless proven otherwise, he presumes legislative history
expresses most credibly the legislative will, and it is enough that this
intent has a hold in the text. Barak’s view that “[t]here is no source
more credible and more appropriate for learning about authorial intent
than the text itself”88 is replaced by a “bottom-up” interpretation that
involves a “labor of ‘digging,’ often tedious.”89 Insofar as it clearly
reflects the legislature’s will, legislative history outweighs the language.
Sohlberg’s opinion in Association of Merchants exemplifies this
shifting of the burden. After finding textual basis for each of the two
opposing interpretations to the regulation of work on the Sabbath, the
linguistic phase ends and the subjective purpose one begins—opening
with legislative history.90 Within the subjective purpose then, the text
no longer plays a significant role, and the author’s will is taken to reside
in external sources, that only need to find accommodation in the
words. This remains true even if the words themselves draw to a
different direction, as the majority in Association of Merchants highlights
and Sohlberg does not dispute.91 Once original intent, as delineated
from legislative history, finds a hold in the text—PO is satisfied.92

Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 144.
87
Gini II, supra note 62, ¶¶ 7–8 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
88
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 135.
89
Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶¶ 2–13 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
90
Id. ¶ 6 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
91
Id. ¶ 43 (Naor, President); ¶¶ 8–9 (Barak-Erez, J., concurring); ¶¶ 5–6
(Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
92
Gini II, supra note 62, ¶ 17 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
85
86
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This approach signifies an openness to seeing the interpretive
process as primarily an empirical-historical rather than a normative
project: reasons become second to causes, and creation is tolerated
only so long as it contributes to finding out what the best discovery
is.93 In this respect it is the mirror image of the prevailing theory—PI
uses no ‘golden presumption’ in ascertaining the objective purpose,
and hence assigns a-priori primacy to normative considerations, as the
‘system’s intent’ does not face the textual hurdles that the author’s
intent faces.
PO levels up the subjective purpose while simultaneously
leveling down the objective purpose. Ostensibly, Justice Sohlberg seeks to
“use interpretive tools to limit the ‘clash’ between ‘the will of the
legislature’ and ‘the will of the system’”94—which is exactly the task of
the purposive interpreter. However, Sohlberg perceives this task very
differently, for he goes on to say: “before using the ‘doomsday weapon’
of judicial review.” This refers to what led the majority in Gini to its
conclusion: the imperative to choose, out of all the subjective purposes
the language can bear, those that do not conflict with the objective
ones. The latter arrive at this meeting after being infused with the
fundamental values of the system, like human rights, democracy,
reasonableness, “justice, morality, and fairness,”95 via the “purposive
presumptions.”96 Sohlberg resists this infusion, in American
terminology, of interpretation with construction—what PI calls
“synthesis and integration”97 is already an act of judicial review.
Barak too asserts that “[m]eaning and validity [ . . . ] are two
separate things,” but that doesn’t stop him from urging the purposive
interpreter to “make every effort to avoid recognizing a contradiction
[between individual and general objective purposes], because a
contradiction would place the validity of the statute in question.”98
Cf. PI’s opposite approach, supra note 53.
Gini II, supra note 62, ¶ 20 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
95
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 173.
96
Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
97
Supra note 37.
98
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 365. A variation
of the same principle in U.S. jurisprudence is the constitutional avoidance doctrine.
See Rivka Weill & Tally Kritzman-Amir, Between Institutional Survival and Human Rights
93
94
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Advocating a clearer boundary between determining the meaning of a
statutory text and subjecting it to constitutional scrutiny, PO takes the
“purposive presumptions” which Barak considers to be “the heart of
legal interpretation,”99 as an adjudicative device alien to the
interpretative process. In Justice Sohlberg’s words: “the law of ought
replaces the law of is.”100 The upshot is that fundamental values cannot
trump original intent within the interpretive process. Sohlberg made
good on this promise in Rom. First, the role of human rights as
interpretive devices was minimized in interpreting the meaning of the
statutory text and determining its purpose. Second, on the basis of the
interpretation already established, the legality of the balance of
interests in the administrative decision was assessed. 101
In the ultimate purpose stage, PI’s language of equilibrium,
synthesis, and proportionality is supplanted by a rule-and-exceptions
model. What is offered is a collision, and then a conclusive method for
declaring the winner—original intent. Thus, Sohlberg rejects the
discretion-conferring approach of ultimate purpose construction that
relies on various continuums. One such continuum is the
chronological: the weight of the objective purpose grows with the
passing of time.102 Justice Sohlberg clarified in Gini that he accepts this
rule in principle, only in that case thirty-four years have passed since
the enactment of the Kosher statute, and “the fundamental debate
remains the same;” then as now the proper place for it is the Knesset
floor.103 This envelopes a turn away from the empirical element PI does
embrace—not as a replacement for normative considerations, but as a
source for them: the social circumstances surrounding any given
statute, from the period prior to its enactment until the time of
interpretation. Sohlberg, as do the other judges in Gini, voices harsh
criticism of the Chief Rabbinate’s regulatory operation, often found to
Protection: Adjudicating Landmark Cases of African Undocumented Entrants in Israel in a
Comparative and International Context, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 43 (2019) (comparing the
doctrine in Israel and the U.S., in the context of immigration detention).
99
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 172.
100
Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶ 2 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
101
Supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
102
Supra note 38. For a similar argument regarding American originalism,
see Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295 (2008).
103
Gini II, supra note 62, ¶¶ 22–24 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
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be corrupt.104 Yet, despite the recognition of a shift in the public
attitude toward the legal scheme, exemplified by the “private
supervision” project the petitioners take part in, and the sound basis
for that shift—these facts do not suffice, because the social conflict
from which the legal question stems is still unresolved.
The bar for the exception to overcome the rule is therefore
very high: time need to have rendered the friction between the
subjective and the objective purposes redundant. This entails a
practical erosion of another of the ultimate purpose continuums: a
change in the character of the legal regime. Between the enactment of
the Kosher statute and its interpretation, the Constitutional Revolution
occurred and seemingly elevated the status of individual rights. Per PO,
this latter element, while prima facie retained in constitutional review,
enjoys no resonance within the interpretive process.
Sohlberg’s Association of Merchants dissent runs further along
this current in its reluctance to assign normative weight to prior
interpretations of the Court to a given statute, inasmuch as they do not
amount to a binding precedent that settles the legal question. In that
case, concurring Justice Barak-Erez stressed that a statute should not
be read as a “blank slate.”105 Considering post-enactment history, as PI
requires, she referred to the way the welfare law has traditionally been
interpreted by courts and implemented by local governments. Sohlberg
also thought the statute should not be interpreted “in a vacuum,” but
he referred solely to the social background at the time of enactment of
the interpreted provision (1968–1969).106 Save for stare decisis, the
empirical-historical project of PO is confined to the history leading to
the creation of the text, and there it ends. This is antithetical to Barak’s
view that the subjective purpose is important not so much in its own
sake, but because “we need the past to understand the present.”107

104
Gini I, supra note 62, ¶¶ 70–72 (Sohlberg, J.); ¶¶ 1–2, 14 (Rubinstein, J.);
¶ 22 (Shoham, J.).
105
Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶ 18 (Barak-Erez, J.,
concurring).
106
Id. ¶ 8 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
107
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 190.
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The result is that the subjective purpose should be ruled
superior when it is “reliable, certain and clear,” including in the case
that the legislature’s intent has no explicit basis in the statutory text but
can still be accommodated with it.108 Any other conclusion confuses
interpretation with judicial review, continued Sohlberg, since
determining the statute’s purpose, and determining its
constitutionality109—are two different stages that must be divorced:
“interpretation deals with the law that is; judicial review deals with the
law that ought (not) to be.”110 Unconstitutionality is thus a second
exception to the triumph of intent. The Constitutional Revolution
justifies the banishment of normative construction from the
interpretive process,111 because the Court’s authority to strike down
statutes that offend human rights creates a binary judicial route to
determine the constitutionality of a statute. Inasmuch as it is not
unconstitutional, the result of the subjective purpose inquiry should
prevail.112
To summarize PO from a purely methodological perspective,
PI’s triangle of “language, purpose, discretion”113 is replaced with a

Gini II, supra note 62, ¶¶ 7–8, 15–17 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
The constitutionality of the Kashrut (Prohibition of Deceit) Law was
scrutinized in Gini I, as the petitioners raised an alternative argument to the
interpretive one, claiming that the statute should be struck down due to its
unconstitutional infringement on freedom of occupation. This argument was
rejected unanimously. The reason constitutional review was conducted only on the
basis of freedom of occupation and not other constitutional rights, is that Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty’s savings clause, unlike the one in Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation, has no expiration date (supra note 17). While these Basic Laws were
enacted in 1992, the statute under scrutiny had already been on the books since 1983
(supra note 66).
110
Gini II, supra note 62, ¶ 16 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). See also PoznanskyKatz, supra note 84, ¶ 3 (Sohlberg, J.).
111
While the distinction Sohlberg insists on is similar to that between
interpretation and construction (see Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011)), he refers more specifically to the act of
scrutinizing a statute in order to determine its constitutionality, according to the tests
of the limitation clause (supra note 15 and accompanying text).
112
Gini II, supra note 62, ¶¶ 15–21 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
113
Supra note 42.
108
109
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triangle of language, original intent, validation.114 What facilitates this
scheme is the elevation of legislative history from a secondary source
for the subjective purpose to the primary interpretive tool the judge
has at her disposal. Thus, at the subjective purpose stage, the textual
source is no longer assigned primacy; at the objective purpose stage,
fundamental values are removed from the interpretive realm, instead
consigned to the realm of judicial review; and at the ultimate purpose
stage, the subjective purpose wins unless it is unconstitutional or
obsolete. While stemming from PI and sharing its general framework,
the basic governing principle of this new method is the legislature’s
original intent, and hence: Purposive Originalism. 115
Justice Sohlberg is the first Barak challenger to devote his
energy to the same aspect of the judicial enterprise as Barak himself—
a comprehensive method of interpretation. Yet he is in no way engaged
in an idiosyncratic project. First, because he also joins previous antiBarak efforts championed by former members of the Court.116 These
were attempts to promote judicial restraint by non-interpretive means,
such as limited scrutiny over executive actions,117 or stricter threshold
114

On the element of validation, see infra notes 256–260 and accompanying

text.
It shares the title and general orientation, but not the details, of Abotsi,
supra note 10 (defining the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Ghana as
incorporating originalist elements into a generally purposive scheme of constitutional
interpretation).
116
See Isaac Roszler, Law as a Prism into National Identity: The Case of Mishpat
Ivri 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 715, 744–50 (2017) (on Justice Menachem Elon);
FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 184–85 (on Justice Eliezer Rivlin); Ittai Bar-SimanTov, John Hart Grunis? The Jurisprudence of Chief Justice Grunis in Light of Ely’s
Constitutional Theory, 9 DIN UDVARIM 67 (2015) [Hebrew] (on Justice Asher Grunis);
Ely Aaronson, Judging as Polemic, 9 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 497, 515–39 (2006) [Hebrew]
(on Justice Mishael Cheshin. Hints of originalist tendencies have been detected in
Justice Cheshin’s jurisprudence. Yair Sagy, The Ruling that Made History: A
Historiographic Analysis of the Mizrahi Bank Decision, 19 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 325, 380
n.279 (2018) [Hebrew]).
117
Sohlberg, On Subjective Values, supra note 63, at 44–55; HCJ 4374/15 The
Movement for Quality Government v. Prime Minister of Israel (Mar. 27, 2016),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
5\740\043\t63&fileName=15043740.T63&type=4 [Hebrew]; a summary of the
case
in
English
is
available
at
115
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requirements for review.118 Second, because Sohlberg has been joined
by newer members of the Court who turn to American conservative
jurisprudence, particularly via interpretive means. As we shall see in
section III.B.2. below, some of whom, especially Justice Alex Stein,
promote a very direct incorporation of such theories into Israeli law.119
Unsurprisingly, legal commentators in the media have begun speaking
of a “conservative camp,” spearheaded by Sohlberg.120 The imperative
to investigate the meaning of such a development cannot be
overstated.
III. AMERICAN-ISRAELI CONSERVATISM
There is a dialogue to be constructed between Purposive
Originalism and paradigmatic shifts currently taking place in the Israeli
political arena, both connoting American conservatism. Granted, no
causal connection can be detected between PO and developments in
American jurisprudence.121 In this it differs from PI, which has been
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Movement%20f
or%20Quality%20Government%20v.%20Prime%20Minister_0.pdf.
118
HCJ 5744/16 Ben Meir v. The Knesset (May 27, 2018), ¶¶ 4–15
(Sohlberg,
J.,
concurring),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
6\440\057\v17&fileName=16057440.V17&type=4 [Hebrew] (on ripeness); AAA
3782/12 Chief of Tel Aviv-Jaffa District, Israel Police v. Israeli Internet Society (Mar.
24,
2013),
¶¶
10–12
(Sohlberg,
J.,
dissenting),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
2\820\037\o07&fileName=12037820_o07.txt&type=4 [Hebrew] (on standing).
119
Infra notes 284, 293–302 and accompanying text.
120
Gil Bringer, The Disappointing New Conservatives: Why Conservative Judges are
Criticized
by
the
Right,
GLOBES
(Sept.
13,
2019),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001300543 [Hebrew]; Doron
Nehemia, The Ruling that Proves the Supreme Court is Beginning to Undergo Activism Rehab,
THEMARKER (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.themarker.com/opinion/.premium1.7680331 [Hebrew].
121
While I make no claim with respect to Justice Sohlberg’s personal
motivations—and would doubt that he consciously appealed to American
Conservatism—it is still very reasonable that there is such a causal connection, for
several reasons. First, the explicit comparison drawn by Sohlberg’s colleagues and
his own rejoinder clarify that the Justices on the Supreme Court of Israel are familiar
with the American debate and find it to be a relevant point of reference for their own
circumstances. Second, American jurisprudence has significant influence over Israeli
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since its inception clearly immersed in American legal liberalism.
Given, however, that the conservative backlash against legal liberalism
in the U.S. culminated in alternative interpretive theories,122 and that
such a theory is being developed in Israel, this invites an exploration
of the conceptual proximity between them. What follows is the argument
that both responses share some key features, and, furthermore, that
both have not presented themselves, to paraphrase Sohlberg, in a
vacuum.123 Rather, there is an ongoing political project in Israel
whereby American conservatism serves as a source of inspiration for
the political Right, on various levels. The potential transition in the
judiciary which PO signals can be better understood against this
backdrop, as one that echoes the transition the American judiciary
witnessed over three decades ago. The analogy thus provides a
framework in which to examine the state of affairs in the Israeli
judiciary and a vocabulary for its evaluation. Moreover, the analogy
may help, in light of the above, to predict where the Israeli debate may
go from here. Even more than its emergence, the conditions
surrounding PO may facilitate its success.
A. American Conservatism
Conservatism denotes primarily a political philosophy—
prescribing how best to conduct the public life of a community, based
on descriptive and normative propositions about the nature of the
academia, which Sohlberg engages with in lectures and talks and wherefrom his
clerks freshly arrive at his chambers each year. Israeli legal education has been
modeled after elite U.S. law schools, and the latter are the foremost destination for
advanced legal studies for aspiring academics. Lahav, American Moment[s], supra note
46; Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Comment on Pnina Lahav, American Moment[s], 10
THEORETICAL INQ. L. F. 58 (2009). Third and relatedly, U.S. law has been
increasingly cited in Israeli Supreme Court rulings since the 1980s, now roughly
equaling the number of citations of all English commonwealth jurisdictions together
(non-common law jurisdictions are seldomly cited). Cohn, supra note 20; Yoram
Shachar, The Supreme Court’s Space of Reliance, 1950–2004, 50 HAPRAKLIT 29, 45–52
(2008) [Hebrew]; RUBINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 192–215. For concrete examples, see
supra note 8. Indeed, the growing American influence over Israeli legal education and
research has induced calls for caution in importing American theories into Israeli law.
Aviram, supra note 8; Haim Sandberg, Cultural Colonialism: The Americanization of Legal
Education in Israel, 14 HAMISHPAT 419, 429–31 (2011) [Hebrew].
122
Infra notes 159–167 and accompanying text.
123
Supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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individual, the collective, and the interaction between them. Derived
from these general propositions are more specific directives for the
organization of political and social institutions. The precise substance
of these prescriptions is, however, notoriously difficult to ascertain, as
conservatism has been termed “one of the most confusing words in
the glossary of political thought,”124 and an ‘essentially contested
concept.’125 This is due in part to the fact that conservatism is not just
a strictly political position, but rather a more comprehensive worldview, encompassing preferences in diverse realms such as the social,
the economic and the legal. Persons and groups subscribe to this
world-view as a matter of identity. As such, conservatism is liberalism’s
only competitor of equal scope and viability in contemporary Global
North public life.126
As a category of legal analysis, Ernest Young suggests that
conservatism should be separated into three distinct branches:
situational (a dispositional resistance to change); political (a first-order
conception of the good); and institutional (a second-order view about
proper organization of societal decision-making).127 Although useful,
this typology is ultimately unsatisfactory, because it neglects to track
the historical and analytical connections between these positions. It is
precisely its insistence on treating these different conservatisms as part
of one project—in spite of the inner tensions that Young

124
CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 5 (2d ed. 1962), cited in
Donald Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 401, 422 n.116 (1986).
125
See W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
SOC’Y 167 (1956) (introducing the category ‘essentially contested concept’); Simon J.
Evnine, Essentially Contested Concepts and Semantic Externalism, 8 J. PHIL. HIST. 118
(2014) (applying it to conservatism); Iain MacKenzie, The Idea of Ideology, in ROBERT
ECCLESHALL ET AL., POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES: AN INTRODUCTION 1, 7 (3rd ed.
2003) (same).
126
Liberalism is also fraught with inner conflicts, but arguably less so. Carl
T. Bogus, Fighting over the Conservative Banner, in NOMOS LVI: AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM 336, 337 (Sanford V. Levinson et al. eds., 2016); but cf. Ruth Abbey,
Is Liberalism Now an Essentially Contested Concept?, 27 NEW POL. SCI. 461 (2005)
(discussing liberalism as an essentially contested concept).
127
Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 COLO. L.
REV. 1139, 1182–203 (2002).
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identifies128—which makes American conservatism stand out, as an allencompassing framework that joins personal beliefs, policy
preferences, and institutional design into an ideology. Accordingly, the
following discussion will be divided along slightly different lines. It
begins by describing conservatism as a political ideology, and then
delineates how the same underlying values translate into legal doctrine
in the interpretive realm.
1. As Political Ideology
In American political life, conservatism as it is known today
had emerged against the backdrop of the Cold War and reached its
heyday during the Reagan administration.129 In public policy terms, it
is a composite of three major strands: social, economic, and national
security conservatisms.130
Social conservatism is grounded chiefly in tradition. Skeptical of
human rationality, the traditionalist view rejects abstract ideals such as
individual natural rights in favor of an organic conception of social
collectivity, which develops in an evolutionary fashion dictated by
ancestral wisdom. Such a social order, which derives moral authority
from existing tradition, custom, and culture—including social
hierarchies—is preferred over a political one manufactured by
application of deductive reasoning.131 For social conservatism, the
Id. at 1203–09.
Andrew J. Perrin et al., From Coalition to Constraint: Modes of Thought in
Contemporary American Conservatism, 29 SOC. F. 285, 286–87 (2014); Julian E. Zelizer,
Rethinking the History of American Conservatism, 38 REV. AM. HIST. 367, 368 (2010). See
generally NOMOS LVI, supra note 126; THE DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM
(Kenneth L. Deutsch & Ethan Fishman eds., 2010); GEORGE H. NASH, THE
CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1945 (30th
anniversary ed. 2006); JONATHAN M. SCHOENWALD, A TIME FOR CHOOSING: THE
RISE OF MODERN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM (2001).
130
James R. Kurth, A History of Inherent Contradictions: The Origins and End of
American Conservatism, in NOMOS LVI, supra note 126, at 13, 14.
131
Bruce P. Frohnen, Law’s Culture: Conservativism and the American
Constitutional Order, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 459, 461–63 (2004); Ernest Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 619, 642–59 (1994). The traditionalist strand of conservatism, championed
in the U.S. by Russell Kirk and others, and often understood as exhaustive of the
conservative frame elsewhere, builds on the thought of English philosopher and
128
129
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good is predicated on time-honored institutions and dogmas that form
a proper basis for public virtue. Social conservatism manifests mainly
in cherishing ‘traditional Judeo-Christian values’ as pertaining to social
institutions like religion and the family.
Economic conservatism’s intellectual infrastructure is very
different, couched in libertarian theories of economic laissez-faire and
neo-liberalism.132 The goal is to promote freedom defined as the
absence of coercion—therefore favoring both small government and
free market. Because coercion necessarily boils down to governmental
paternalism,133 libertarians apply the logic of deregulation to various
economic and political settings.134
Libertarianism stands in tension with traditionalism, because it
assigns primacy to right over virtue, favors negative liberty, and trusts
human rationality.135 The third conservative school of thought, from
which national security conservatism draws, neoconservatism, strives for
reconciliation. One of neoconservatism’s notable articulators, Irving
Kristol, identified its core as support for free market economy situated
within a narrative of organic collectivity. Minimum bureaucratic
intrusion into the individual’s affairs safeguards their liberty, yet the
idea that individuals “can ‘create’ their own values and then
incorporate them into a satisfying ‘lifestyle’” is met with skepticism.136
Instead, values are generated by traditional institutions like “religion,

politician Edmund Burke. See, e.g., YUVAL LEVIN, THE GREAT DEBATE: EDMUND
BURKE, THOMAS PAINE, AND THE BIRTH OF RIGHT AND LEFT (2013). For a survey
of conflicting interpretations of Burke, see NASH, supra note 129, at 251–56.
132
Or ‘classical liberalism,’ as opposed to the welfare liberalism advocated
by scholars of legal liberalism. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL
CONSTITUTION (2014).
133
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 11–21 (1960).
134
NASH, supra note 129, at 238–43; Ethan Fishman & Kenneth L. Deutsch,
Introduction, in DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM, supra note 129, at 1, 2–3;
Perrin et al., supra note 139, at 291.
135
These tensions may nonetheless be reconcilable. For instance, by
suggesting that virtue can only or best be achieved by participation in the free market.
See Zelizer, supra note 129, at 372.
136
Irving Kristol, What Is “Neoconservative”?, in THE NEOCONSERVATIVE
PERSUASION: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1942–2009 148, 149 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
2011).
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the family, the ‘high culture’ of Western civilization.”137 Active
protection of the latter is a special emphasis of neoconservatism,
enshrining the use of force in service of “American ideals.”138
Neoconservatism highlights strong nationalist sentiments and seeks to
cultivate intra-societal cohesion through the dichotomy of friend
versus foe, hence supporting militaristic agendas and hawkish
formulations of patriotism.
Each of these political stances correlates at bottom with a
specific set of philosophical convictions and their intellectual sources,
although the nexuses are not seamless.139 Thus, traditionalists cherish
American exceptionalism as a preservation of entrenched values and a
prudent continuation of existing practice, inspired by classical virtues
of hard work and good character in a communal setting.140 Local
associations and communities flourish in such soil.141 Libertarians, on
the other hand, espouse the Lockean framework of natural rights and
construe American sovereignty as aspiring to safeguard the individual
against tyranny. This conception of freedom is, however,
complemented by an approach to social interaction neighboring the
traditionalist one. The proper climate for persons to pursue their own
ends is a “spontaneous order,” which arises without top-bottom design
but rather via voluntary associations and exchanges, i.e. the invisible
hand.142 Leo Strauss, a major influence on neoconservatism, lamented
the absence of objective standards for recognizing and advancing what
is naturally good in public life. He thus understood “natural rights”
differently from the social contract tradition, as a universal truth about
the best way to live, which was espoused by the Founding Fathers but
later abandoned in favor of individualism and relativism. 143 The
content of this framework is that “nature is essentially hierarchical,” an
Id.
Max Boot, Neocons, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 20, 24 (adding
that the question of whether the U.S. should actively and forcefully export its ideals,
is a matter of controversy among neoconservatives).
139
See Bogus, supra note 126, at 336; Jonathan O’Neill, Constitutional
Conservatism and American Conservatism, in NOMOS LVI, supra note 126, at 292, 319–20.
140
Frohnen, supra note 131, at 466–69.
141
Id. at 476; see also O’Neill, supra note 139, at 305–06.
142
O’Neill, supra note 139, at 308–14; see also A. I. Ogus, Law and Spontaneous
Order: Hayek’s Contribution to Legal Theory, 16 J.L. & SOC. 393 (1989).
143
O’Neill, supra note 139, at 314–20.
137
138
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inegalitarianism determined by substantive value properly assigned to
people’s lives.144
While it is unclear how solid the alliance remains in the age of
Trump,145 this is still the general framework in which conservative
commitments are navigated and merged into a cohesive whole, as far
as possible.146 The major common theoretical denominators are an
organic conception of society across time; emphasis on the concrete
circumstances of political collectives, rooted in their time and place;
and natural human inequality. 147 These allow all three conservatisms to
efficiently coalesce in the political realm, in order to promote shared
goal and oppose shared enemies. The latter consists mostly of civil
rights struggles. For instance, those directed at liberating vulnerable
members of the family, such as women or LGBT children, from the
hold of its patriarch. If successful, such struggles push the welfare state
into the household, taking over the responsibility for its members’
well-being, and severing any necessary ties between a person’s heritage
and their chosen way of life.148 Thus, despite the very different
philosophical motivations—reliance on ancestral wisdom for

STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM 70–71 (1993).
See, e.g., Austin Bramwell, What is Principled Conservatism?, AM. AFF., Spring
2018,
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/what-is-principledconservatism/; Corey Robin, Triumph of the Shill: The Political Theory of Trumpism, 29
N+1 31 (2017), available at https://nplusonemag.com/issue-29/politics/triumph-ofthe-shill; but cf. Peter Beinart, The Fear Driving Conservative Support for Kavanaugh,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
27,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/kavanaughrepublicans/571477 (claiming that President Trump signifies no change for
conservatism: “Trumpism, at its core, is a rebellion against changes in American
society that undermine traditional hierarchies”).
146
Some are skeptical about this possibility and settle for an “I know it when
I see it” approach. See Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 127, at 1196. In this vein,
William F. Buckley suggested asking not “what conservatism is,” but “who a
conservative is.” Jonathan Mendilow, What is Conservatism? Some Signposts in the
Wilderness, 1 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 221, 225 (1996).
147
Mendilow, supra note 146, at 222–25. See also Kurth, supra note 130, at
14–15; NASH, supra note 129, at 235–86.
148
MELINDA COOPER, FAMILY VALUES: BETWEEN NEOLIBERALISM AND
THE NEW SOCIAL CONSERVATISM 7–24 (2017).
144
145
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traditionalists, moral Darwinism for libertarians,149 and a quest for a
nationalist common good for neoconservatives—the upshot is
common discontent with redistributional schemes and progressive
design of public policy heralded by espousing the vantage point of
underprivileged groups. Other common causes are “tough” policies on
crime and immigration, and deregulation of private ownership of
firearms. In the light of the landmark originalist decision in D.C. v.
Heller,150 this latter issue epitomizes the conceptual and historical ties
between political and judicial conservatism.151
The connecting link between politics and adjudication is the
relevant law. The U.S. Constitution is central to all conservative
strands. It advances and reconciles these visions by securing the rule
of law, which guarantees the stability and certainty necessary for free
transactions; protecting the boundaries of each person’s possessions
and entitlements to create a secure climate for inter-subjective
transactional conduct; and promising constraints on institutional
planning for the entire political community, by keeping powers
separate.152 The Constitution facilitates a higher moral order that ought
to transcend state institutions and keep personal responsibility from
being shunned by top-down designs. It additionally provides a
document of perpetual relevance to rely upon for guidance. As Justice
Scalia asserts, it has an intrinsic “antirevolutionary purpose.”153 Thus,
per American conservatism, decades of progressive policies that
aspired for false egalitarianism and a welfare state have distorted the
original Constitution produced in the Founding era. 154 The way it
ought to be used is rather as a vehicle for containment of change.

Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV.
641, 658 (1990).
150
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
151
Jamal Greene, Guns, Originalism, and Cultural Cognition, 13 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 511 (2010); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008).
152
O’Neill, supra note 139; Greene, Guns, Originalism, and Cultural Cognition,
supra note 151, at 521–22.
153
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 44 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997).
154
Frohnen, supra note 131, at 471.
149
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2. As Judicial Ideology
The most straightforward manner to adjudicate conservatively
is to issue decisions whose results would be favorable to political
conservatives. In this vein, scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Robin
West have argued that juridical camps ultimately divide along lines of
political orientation.155 West concedes that conservative jurists may
hold principled jurisprudential views, but they all ultimately reach
similar results because their different jurisprudences justify in different
ways the same conception of the good: conservatives of all strands
assign high value to forms of social and private power that are
grounded in communitarian wisdom and preservation of hierarchies.156
They distrust centralized power so long as it is used for redistribution
purposes, in lieu of “a duty to promote, protect, and encourage that
form of life reflected in the community’s social structures and
preexisting entitlements.”157 It follows from such views that the best
way to gauge judicial conservatism is by outcomes.
Empirical evidence lends support to this approach.158 In
tandem with the formation of modern American conservatism in the
political sphere, a judicial one was formed as well. Against the
backdrop of legal liberalism, by the 1980s the recognition that
constitutional adjudication can hardly be politically neutral reemerged
among both conservatives and progressives. 159 But only the former
group was in power. The backlash against legal liberalism orchestrated
by the Reagan administration placed an unprecedented premium, for
155
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 20–23 (2009);
West, supra note 149, at 648.
156
West, supra note 149, at 643. See also Young, Judicial Activism, supra note
127, at 1187–97 (discussing political as opposed to situational and institutional
conservatism).
157
West, supra note 149, at 653.
158
NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW
PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (2019); Daniel R. Pinello,
Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219
(1999). See also Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme
Court, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671 (2015) (arguing that alongside the left/right
ideological continuum, judges’ positions on a legalism/pragmatism continuum are
also empirically significant).
159
West, supra note 149; KALMAN, supra note 44, at 132–33.
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political purposes, first on the judiciary in general, and second on
interpretive methodology in particular.160 The successful campaign to
“undo the Warren Court legacy,”161 which resulted in a “paradigmatic
shift” in American legal discourse,162 was anchored in conservative
interpretive methods, newly articulated in response to the liberal ones.
Hence, the failed nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme
Court in 1987, instilling the term originalism in the public
consciousness, was nonetheless a success.163 Since that time, the
process of judicial appointment to the federal bench, rendered
inherently political by the Constitution,164 has grown increasingly
divisive. The interpretive theory judges adhere to is a central
manifestation of the split between conservatives and liberals.

See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659–60 (2009);
William P. Marshall, The Judicial Nominations Wars, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 819 (2005);
KALMAN, supra note 44, at 132. Although perfected by the Reagan administration,
President Nixon similarly defined the conservative judges he desired in both
doctrine- and policy-oriented terms, as faithful to the Constitution and as providing
tools for the strengthening of the “peace forces as against the criminal forces in our
society.” Quoted in John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920, 945 (1973).
161
Marshall, supra note 160, at 821. See also, e.g., Keith E. Whittington,
Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 394 (2013); Horwitz,
Bork Nomination, supra note 3, at 1033.
162
West, supra note 149, at 643.
163
JONATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS:
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 168–89 (2007). See also Horwitz, Bork Nomination, supra
note 3, at 1034–37 (stipulating that the controversy surrounding the Bork
nomination was about a ‘Newtonian’ as opposed to an evolutionary conception of
rights, no less than interpretive methodology. The legitimacy of recognizing new
rights hinges on the assertion that they were always in the constitution, hence,
although Bork’s nomination was rejected, “originalism and a fundamentalist view of
rights triumphed”).
164
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that federal judges will be appointed
by the President with the confirmation of the Senate); David E. Pozen, The Irony of
Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2008) (exploring the pros and cons of
elective processes to state benches). The politicization of Supreme Court judicial
nominations reached a new low in 2018 with the appointment of Justice Kavanaugh.
See DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 158, at ix–xvii; Jeannie Suk Gersen, Brett Kavanaugh’s
Damaging, Revealing Partisan Bitterness, NEW YORKER (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/brett-kavanaughs-damagingrevealing-partisan-bitterness-supreme-court-confirmation.
160
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Methodology appears as transcending policy arguments,
utilizing neutral language as a basis “for attacking wide swaths of
judicial doctrine at once.”165 Orienting judicial integrity along
interpretive methodology lines turns methodological gaps into
ideological polarization, lest judges’ rulings be perceived as
inconsistent, subjective, and ironically, political. 166 It demands
methodological purism of judges on both sides. Yet if originalism and
textualism are viewed, like any other judicial method, as mere vessels
for effective channeling of discretion behind a veil of objectivity and
constraint, then their audience may not be the legal community at all.
Indeed, Margaret Lemos claims that laypeople who lack the capacity
or the will to look behind the veil, are “the consumers of the shell
game.”167 Under this light, the link between conservatism and
interpretive methods is a marriage of convenience. Methodology is
chosen in order to rationalize ideology-driven results and internalize
them into the legal doctrine.
But adjudication may also realize conservative values
intrinsically rather than instrumentally. Three inter-related tenets lie at
the crux of conservative jurisprudence in the U.S.: originalism, brightline rules, and deference.168 The unifying theme of this threefold
framework is majoritarianism,169 and the goal is primarily to resolve the
counter-majoritarian difficulty and limit judicial discretion by requiring
an adherence to the value judgments of the representative branches of
government.170

165
Lemos, supra note 1, at 898; Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too
Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 34 (2011) [hereinafter Whittington,
Conservatism].
166
Lemos, supra note 1, at 902; Marshall, supra note 160, at 826; KALMAN,
supra note 44, at 132.
167
Lemos, supra note 1, at 889–90. See also Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia,
130 HARV. L. REV. 144 (2016) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s contribution to
constitutional jurisprudence amounts primarily to an effective articulation of
conservative values, without it leading to a substantive transformation in the law or
in the Court’s overall jurisprudential dispositions).
168
Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 131, at 625–42.
169
Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 127, at 1201.
170
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, What Conservative Constitutional Revolution?
Moderating Five Degrees of Judicial Conservatism After Six Years of the Roberts Court, 64
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Originalism, which applies exclusively to constitutional
interpretation, was at its origin intentionalism: setting the judge on a
historical quest to figure out the original intent of the Framers and
restricting interpretive legitimacy to these boundaries. 171 It was tied by
its adherents to judicial restraint, as a direct response to legal liberalism.
This was also a time when the Right prevailed politically, and hence
controlled the non-judicial decision-making mechanisms deferred
to.172 Today, originalism is a family of theories united by two core
principles: that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed; and that the
interpreter is constrained by it.173 The most notable variation
substitutes original intent with original public meaning. The
interpretive endeavor is still ideally an empirical-historical one, only
now the fact it tracks is meaning rather than intent.174 The focus shifts
to the potential understanding of the governed, whose consent
legitimized political authority, at the historical moment in which this
consent materialized.
In any variation, originalism is a conservative method of
interpretation, because political settlements of past generations are
given binding normative force.175 Predicating legitimate authority on
popular consent is a liberal principle, placing the judicial focus on the
ordinary citizen entering the social contract instead of the expert

RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); KALMAN, supra note 44, at 136; Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 (1989).
171
See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights,
23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986); Raoul Berger, New Theories of “Interpretation”: The
Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1986).
172
See Lemos, supra note 1, at 865–69; Whittington, Originalism, supra note
161, at 391–93; Whittington, Conservatism, supra note 165, at 29.
173
Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2015); Whittington, Originalism, supra note
161, at 377 (original meaning is “discoverable” and ought to be “authoritative”).
174
E.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME
COURT 47–57, 133–34 (2018); Barnett, Interpretation, supra note 111, at 66 (“It cannot
be overstressed that the activity of determining semantic meaning at the time of
enactment required by the first proposition [the fixation thesis] is empirical, not
normative”).
175
O’Neill, supra note 139, at 302, 321–23; Whittington, Conservatism, supra
note 165, at 38.
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authority, and hence public meaning rather than intent. 176 Nonetheless,
this formalization of democracy is sharply at odds with legal liberalism.
For legal liberalism attunes this same principle to evolving social
realities. It does not rely on a contractarian view of democracy that is
devoid of substance and that remains transfixed by the settlements of
past generations.177 Legal liberalism strives to rule by the will of the
governed while still advancing the value of progress, holding on to a
belief in inalienable natural rights, and refusing to reduce ought to is.178
For liberals, the normative force of consent is a rational construction;
for conservatives, it is a historical fact. The Founding Fathers were
committed both to the idea of progress and to the idea of tradition,
and sought to implement both in the Constitution.179 But these two
176
O’Neill, supra note 139, at 296–98; Greene, Selling Originalism, supra note
160; O’NEILL, supra note 163, at 3–4; Sean B. Cunningham, Is Originalism “Political”?,
1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 149, 150 (1997). Some conservatives would put
majoritarianism and absolute truths on one side, liberalism and consent on the
other—and they may claim Locke should be situated in the first category. Thus,
conservative intellectual Willmoore Kendall insisted that interpretation of the
American ethos should rely on public orthodoxy rather than natural rights, the
former filtered by the constitutional structure of government. Daniel McCarthy,
Willmoore Kendall, Man of the People, in DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM, supra
note 129, at 175, 175–76. Kendall offers a middle path between traditionalism and
libertarianism, by understanding the individualist Locke as an advocate of majority
rule; resisting the aristocratic tendencies of traditionalists like Kirk; grounding social
truths on the American democratic tradition of the Founding Fathers, which
generates virtuous representatives with “moral expertise;” and situating this
framework as the opposite of “the revolutionary attempt by liberals to transform the
country into an open society.” Id. at 179–84; see also Elfenbein, supra note 124, at 416;
NASH, supra note 129, at 552.
177
See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 630–31, 639, 656–60 (2008); KALMAN, supra note 44, at
135. For an attempt to reconcile originalism with a substantive commitment to a
certain conception of liberty, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION (2004).
178
Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT
LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 184–88 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002);
Ronald Dworkin, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 81 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds.,
1999); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS 56 (1995); Elfenbein, supra
note 124.
179
Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 3, 17–21 (2001) (on progress); J. Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudence
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values place tensions on each other. Rationalization of history
disorders and destabilizes, demanding radical changes that defy
tradition.180 Originalism chooses tradition over progress, by focusing
exclusively on the social contract’s forefather-reverential “preservation
clause” rather than its intergenerational “innovation clause.” 181
Favoring will over reason, originalism expresses “a model of history
divorced from the idea of progress.”182
There are analytical as well as historical ties between liberalism,
progress, and secularization (all value reform), versus conservatism,
dogma, and religion (all value orthodoxy). As Morton Horwitz
explains, “constitutional law is the successor to religion and religious
categories in an increasingly secularized society. Originalism in
constitutional doctrine shares the same psychological yearning for
certainty that religious fundamentalism does.”183 Just as conservatism
as a political ideology aims to restore something of value that has been
lost, namely conservatives are victims of progress,184 so does
originalism resists change in constitutional meaning: “Originalists are
busy at restoring the ideal by narrowing the perceived gap between the
ideal and the real.”185

of Tradition and Justice Scalia’s Unwritten Constitution, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 19, 31 (2000)
(on tradition).
180
David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1038–40
(1991).
181
Id. at 1055. See also David Fontana, Comparative Originalism, 88 TEX. L.
REV. SEE ALSO 189, 196 (2010) (finding that originalist theories tend to present
themselves in countries that have “revolutionary” rather than “reorganizational”
constitutions, the former “more focused on the founding moment”).
182
David Aram Kaiser, Putting Progress Back into Progressive: Reclaiming a
Philosophy of History for the Constitution, 6 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 257, 259 (2014).
183
Horwitz, Bork Nomination, supra note 3, at 1033. See also MARY ANNE
FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION (2019) (exploring more recent
manifestations of same idea); Mark Tushnet, Conservative Constitutional Theory, 59 TUL.
L. REV. 910, 911 (1985) (differentiating “anticonstitutional majoritarianism” and
“nostalgic originalism” from “conservative versions of liberal theories”).
184
COREY ROBIN, THE REACTIONARY MIND: CONSERVATISM FROM
EDMUND BURKE TO SARAH PALIN 58–59 (2011) (“conservatism [is] not the Party of
Order, as Mill and others have claimed, but the party of the loser”).
185
Adam Shinar, Idealism and Realism in Israeli Constitutional Law, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: BRIDGING IDEALISM AND REALISM
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Hence, an originalist method may yield outcomes associated
with liberalism/progressivism as a policy matter (for example, freedom
from religion), and an evolutionary method may similarly produce
conservative outcomes.186 Nevertheless, an evolutionary method of the
legal liberalism mold cannot be intrinsically conservative. For it views
the ontological status of legal meaning as always already dependent on
a rational, teleological dialogue between interpreter and text.187
Conversely, an originalist method cannot be intrinsically liberal, as it
believes meaning to be independent of this hermeneutic dialogue. 188
Originalism enables subjection of present generations to the
preferences of past ones. It thereby construes society as an entity
superior to the individuals comprising it,189 and translates stagnation
and dogma into interpretive doctrine. This facilitates a reconciliation
of institutional preferences for majoritarianism with ideological
positions favoring conservative values. These values can be of a more
abstract nature, like order, prudence, moderation, and harmony; and
more concrete, like social hierarchy (most social groups had no
franchise when ratification took place), tradition (legal structures are
revered just by virtue of being generated by the forefathers’ will), and
responsibility (don’t like it? change it!). Consider the value of security.
While a basic human desire and an aspiration of most political

257, 260 (Maurice Adams, Anne Meuwese & Ernst Hirsch Ballin eds., 2017); see also
Siegel, supra note 151, at 216–25.
186
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism versus Living Constitutionalism: The
Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1268–70 (2019);
Yvonne Tew, Stealth Theocracy, 58 VA. J. INT’L L. 31 (2018).
187
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 609 (1990).
188
Solum, Fixation, supra note 173, at 20–21; Whittington, Originalism, supra
note 161, at 407; Barnett, Interpretation, supra note 111, at 65; Samaha, Dead Hand, supra
note 177, at 639.
189
It is thus unsurprising that Justice Scalia saw the structure of government
rather than the Bill of Rights as the greatest achievement of the American
Constitution, confident that the tyranny of the majority is thus sufficiently curtailed
and freedom guaranteed. Ruth Bader Ginsberg & Antonin Scalia, KALB REPORT, Apr.
17, 2014, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z0utJAu_iG4; note that
Justice Ginsburg is inclined to go the other way and give precedence to the Bill of
Rights as the central constitutional pillar of American freedom. Id.
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schemes,190 security is held in particularly high regard by all
conservatives, translating into both social values like safety, 191 and legal
ones like certainty and stability. Jurisprudential conservatism advances
all. Originalism ensures that reform is undertaken only “piecemeal and
with caution,” substituting ideology with the “normative force of
history” (stability).192 Deference overlooks infringements on rights,
allowing the government to promote national security (safety). Brightline rules reject the premium living constitutionalists put on political
morality, instead facilitating the narrower originalist prism that is
content with knowing what to look for (certainty).193
Indeed, originalism is only one part of a larger adjudicative
project. Both judicial and academic originalists see it as a special case
of textualism, 194 a helpful framing for understanding how
interpretation ties in to the other basic tenets of conservative
jurisprudence, formalism, and deference. The “whole purpose” of a
Constitution, in Justice Scalia’s mind, is to prevent change.195 Scalia
insisted that not only the Constitution, but also “statutes do not
change.”196 The twin originalist convictions, that the meaning of the
law is fixed and that the judge is constrained by it, are true for statutory
interpretation too.197
This framing invites the question of whether statutory
textualism should also be considered a conservative theory. For the
purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to provide a definitive
answer to this question.198 But it is necessary to address the most
significant variation between constitutional and statutory variations of
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 98–102 (2010) (describing the
conceptualization of liberty as security in Left-leaning movements).
191
Frohnen, supra note 131, at 474.
192
Id. at 478–81. See also André LeDuc, Originalism’s Claims and Their
Implications, 70 ARK. L. REV. 1007, 1074–86 (2018).
193
Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 45.
194
Whittington, Originalism, supra note 161, at 390; Scalia, Common-Law, supra
note 153, at 37.
195
Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 40.
196
Id.
197
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 78–92.
198
For such a discussion, see Lemos, supra note 1.
190

426

2020

Rise of American Conservatism in Israel

8:2

textualism, and that is the status of legislative history199—a central
component of PO. This interpretive device has some place in any
version of a purposive approach, favored by liberals. Textualists
generally reject its use, yet they do embrace it in originalist
constitutional interpretation, rendering them “semanticists in statutory
cases, but historicists in constitutional cases.”200 For even in its
original-meaning rather than original-intent phase, originalism heavily
relies on deliberation history to ascertain binding meaning, 201 as well as
on other sources external to the text, read by the judge for the purpose
of understanding fixed meanings at fixed times.202 This constitutes a
“conservative bias,”203 warranting an application not only of a
centuries-old moral vision, but one that took for granted the exclusion
of most groups in society from the political body.204 Fixed meaning is
complemented by fixed political identity. Statutory textualism, on the
other hand, denies the relevance of legislative history altogether,205 and
uses instead various canons and presumptions.206

199
On top of some conventional differences that apply more or less across
the board. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 190, at 292.
200
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist But
Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301 (1998) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Legislative History]; see also Ralf Poscher, Hermeneutics, Jurisprudence and Law,
in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO HERMENEUTICS 451, 452–54 (Jeff Malpas &
Hans-Helmuth Gander eds., 2015). The more recent semanticist turn in
constitutional interpretation is yet to cross the lines from academia to judicial
application. Solum, Originalism, supra note 186, at 1250–62.
201
Lemos, supra note 1, at 893–94; Eskridge, Legislative History, supra note
200, at 1301; Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 38; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice
Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).
202
Post-enactment material can be considered too, in order to discern
original understanding—the purpose is empirical, not normative. See Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783, 2805 (Scalia, J.).
203
Eskridge, Legislative History, supra note 200, at 1317.
204
See Annaleigh E. Curtis, Why Originalism Needs Critical Theory: Democracy,
Language, and Social Power, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 437 (2015).
205
Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 29; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
1, at 369–90.
206
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1 (listing, aside from “fundamental
values,” semantic canons; syntactic canons; contextual canons; expected-meaning
canons; government-structuring canons; private-right canons; and stabilizing
canons). In practice, nearly all judges do consider legislative history to some extent,
although liberal ones more so. Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory
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There is a tension here with respect to conservative
principles.207 On the one hand, the legislature is deemed an institution
more closely attached than the judiciary to ordinary people, as its
members are elected by the popular sovereign. The legislature more
accurately reflects “the actual practices of society,” as Scalia put it.208
This assertion is both deferential and formalist. It is an efficient way to
produce clear and categorical rules, consistent with the rule of law
which is “about form [ . . . formalism] is what makes a government a
government of laws and not of men.”209 At the same time, the
conservative reverence for social hierarchies and concern for stability
fosters suspicion toward legislatures. Legislation is a process of
communal plan-making for the future, carrying high potential for
disruption of order and flattening of natural differences.210
Adjudicative law as such is a conservative project, substantively and
procedurally. The morality absorbed in the judicial process is “almost
invariably conventional and traditional, rather than aspirational or
utopian,” as West explains, because it is “profoundly elitist, hierarchic,
and nonparticipatory [ . . . ] the antithesis of participatory democratic
politics.”211 Indeed, from Blackstone through Hayek to contemporary
policy-makers in developing countries,212 common law adjudication
Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1298 (2018); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’
Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 117 (2008).
207
Young describes this tension as one between the situational (antirevolutionary) and the institutional (anti-administrative state) aspects of
conservatism. Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 127, at 1197.
208
Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 170, at 1184; see also Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 854, 862 (1989).
209
Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 25. See also Jamal Greene, Rule
Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639 (2016); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and
Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal
Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005); Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 131,
at 706–08; Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 170, at 1178, 1184.
210
See John Ferejohn, Legislation, Planning, and Deliberation, in COLLECTIVE
WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 95, 100–04 (Hélène Landemore & Jon
Elster eds., 2012).
211
West, supra note 149, at 715 (emphasis in original); see also Broughton,
supra note 179, at 25.
212
Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and the Rule of Law, 1 LEGISPRUDENCE 91
(2015).
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has been construed as a steady force of pre-existing tradition; an
incremental evolution of order that responds to social reality from
within rather than pre-planned by political authorities; and an
articulation of the values of the local community, allowing its members
to communicate and transact freely. The textualist utilization of
common law maxims expresses such inclinations. Filtering
adjudicative settlements through conventional canons accommodates
the moderation-inducing features of common law. So, ultimately, it
might be the case that the conservatism of textualism is simply the
conservatism inherent in any common law system.213
B. Israeli-American Conservatism
1. As Judicial Ideology
How does Purposive Originalism relate to American
Conservatism? To begin connecting the dots, a brief recap of the
central tenets of PO. It assigns legislative history conclusive weight in
discerning a statute’s purpose, because it is the most reliable source to
point at the original intent of the legislature. Meaning is therefore
considered to be fixed. An inter-related implication is that the nature
of the judicial task is an empirical-historical one. Accordingly, the bar
for considerations of social change following enactment is raised
significantly, and overarching values lose their status as guidelines for
interpretation. Continuums and balances are replaced by binary,
conclusion-generating formulae, that preserve the basic constitutional
order while sharpening the contours of each stage in the interpretation
process. This account should ring a bell, for its basic principles are
variations on originalism, bright-line rules and deference.
Originalism: there are both continuities and discontinuities
between PO and American originalism. The former endorses the two
basic tenets of the latter—that meaning is fixed, and that it constrains
the interpreter.214 However, it takes a different form than the American
Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
But cf. Luban, supra note 180 (emphasizing the rationality of the common law as a
historical rather than a historicist enterprise).
214
Although PO is less stringent than American textualism, as a narrow
window for temporal change is preserved (supra notes 102–107 and accompanying
213
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prototype, in two major ways. First, it applies originalist methodology
to statutory rather than constitutional material (thus far). Second, it is
closer to intentionalism, a strand that had ushered the conservative
backlash in the U.S. but has since fallen out of fashion.215 Both aspects
make good sense, from the perspective of conservative values, when
applied to Israeli law. Statutory history is ostensibly a liberal element
in the American context, as conservatives accord heavy weight to
historical background only in constitutional interpretation. But the real
difference is the objective of the interpretive process, whether an
‘original’ (empirical) or an ‘evolving’ (normative) kind of thing.216
Consider Scalia’s reasons for rejecting legislative intent: it is
alien to traditional judicial practice;217 it is dubious that any detailed and
cohesive intent can be genuinely assigned to a body such as
Congress;218 it encourages legislators to manipulate interpretation by
inserting discarded purposes into legislative protocols; 219 and, most
importantly, “under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing
unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue
text). A possible explanation for this gap may be that in the Jewish tradition, meaning
is dynamic and religious texts constantly reinterpreted—so much so that the Talmud
rather than the Bible is the central text for religious practice. By contrast,
Protestantism views the biblical text, and by analogy the Constitution, as the
beginning and end of all inquiry.
215
Even though intentionalism “has never entirely disappeared.” Solum,
Originalism, supra note 186, at 1251; see also Whittington, Originalism, supra note 161, at
382.
216
Whittington, Originalism, supra note 161, at 389; Scalia, Common-Law, supra
note 153, at 16. An alternative taxonomy, offered by Israeli scholars Shahar Lifshitz
and Elad Finkelstein, suggests assessing interpretive theories according to three axes:
how independent the text is from its author’s intent; whether the method of inquiry
is linguistic or purposivist; and the division of labor between author and interpreter.
Shahar Lifshitz & Elad Finkelstein, A Hermeneutic Perspective on the Interpretation of
Contracts, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 519, 526–43 (2017). In these terms, PO can be
characterized as an authorial-linguistic approach; PI a textual-purposivist one; and
American originalism a textual-linguistic one. See Id. at 538–41.
217
Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 29–30.
218
Id. at 31–32. See also John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1911 (2015); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). I do not dwell on this point
in comparing PI and PO because Barak and Sohlberg agree that legislative will exists
and that it deserves some degree of consideration.
219
Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 34–36.
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their own objectives and desires.”220 The counter-majoritarian
difficulty is the fiercest common enemy of both Justice Sohlberg and
American conservatism, wary of interpreting the law to mean “what it
ought to mean.”221 Scalia’s weapon of choice was canons, coupled with
historical material in constitutional cases; Sohlberg’s is legislative
history.
This choice is better suited for furthering a conservative
jurisprudence in the Israeli context, as is choosing intent over public
meaning, because the boundary between the constitutional and the
statutory text is much blurrier. PO is on board with PI in treating
statutory and constitutional texts as consecutive points on the same
axis, as well as understanding subjective purpose to denote the
legislature’s articulated goals rather than hidden thoughts.222 This
inquiry thus requires no foray into extra-legislative sources, setting PO
apart from currently prevailing originalist theories which look for
Constitutional communicative content fixed to the time of its
utterance.223 PO’s elevation of legislative history is not only due to the
Basic Laws’ recency, vague normative status prior to 1995, and a matter
of continuous contestation.224 It is also due to the fact that these laws
are enacted in the regular course of parliamentary work: in the same
physical institution; by the same people, even if acting under two
distinct hats;225 and with the same procedure as regular statutes,
including passing with no more than a simple majority—and the same
goes for the amendment of most Basic Laws provisions. Israeli
220
221

Id. at 17–18. See also Scalia, Originalism, supra note 208, at 863.
Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 22; text accompanying supra note

110.
Gini II, supra note 62, ¶ 11 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). Cf. Scalia, CommonLaw, supra note 153, at 16–17 (“We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent”), to which
Barak replies: “New textualism correctly points out that the legislature enacted the
statute and not the intent. However, that does not mean that we cannot take the
intent into consideration, in order to understand the statute.” BARAK, PURPOSIVE
INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 280.
223
Solum, Fixation, supra note 173, at 6–9.
224
Supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text.
225
On the ‘two hats’ theory, adopted by Barak, see Mautner, Protection of
Liberal Rights, supra note 14, at 127–29, 134–36; Claude Klein, Basic Laws, Constituent
Power and Judicial Review of Statutes in Israel: Bank Hamizrahi United v. Kfar Chitufi
Migdal and Others, 2 EUR. PUB. L. 225, 230–33 (1996).
222
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constitutional law did not constitute the legal order from scratch, but
was added atop, or rather shoved beneath, a pre-existing one. Pursuant
to these factors and most importantly, the conservative view in Israel
is to downplay rather than elevate the cultural and legal stature of the
Basic Laws.226
Under these circumstances, Sohlberg’s reliance on legislative
will best addresses the counter-majoritarian difficulty to conservative
satisfaction. Scalia’s trade-off between the clarity the constitutional text
lacks and the consensus it enjoys, would not work; in Israel, there is
usually no difference in clarity of original meaning, and consensus
favors legislation. Nor would strict reliance on canons work, because
Barak’s schema already incorporates them and maximizes their
potential for judicial liberation.227 Similarly to the beginning of
American originalism, the only antidote perceived as strong enough
against a powerful teleology is the will of the lawmaker, ensuring
judicial objectivity, textual clarity, and public consensus, which reflect
the actual practices of society.228 Justice Breyer contrasts originalism
with his own approach that is “concerned with the conditions of
life.”229 The question is whose life. Whereas Barak treated the author

One manifestation of this downplay is the high frequency of
amendments to the Basic Laws, most of which are not entrenched. Thus, the rightwing majority twentieth Knesset, which was in place in the years 2015–2019,
amended the Basic Laws 13 times. KNESSET LEGAL CHAMBERS, LEGISLATION IN
THE
TWENTIETH
KNESSET
19
(2019),
available
at
https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/documents/Kn20Legislation.pdf
[Hebrew].
227
Cf. Scalia’s “profoundly liberating” use of canons. Lemos, supra note 1,
at 899.
228
Supra note 208 and accompanying text.
229
The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands, A Conversation on the
Constitution:
Judicial
Interpretation,
YOUTUBE
(Apr.
20,
2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VGKgJdW55nc.
226
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as dead230 and the constitution as living, 231 Sohlberg takes steps toward
resurrecting the author and killing the constitution.232
Yet not all conditions of life are created equal.233 One way to
explain PO’s resonance chiefly in state and religion cases is as a latent
contestation over the human rights Basic Laws’ normative supremacy.
The pieces of legislation Sohlberg defended reflect what is known as
‘the status quo:’ the compromise reached between the Zionist
leadership and the ultra-Orthodox one toward the establishment of
Israel, facilitating mutual cooperation. ‘The status quo’ balances
competing approaches to Judaism in the public sphere, providing
exclusive jurisdiction to religious courts over marriage and divorce
proceedings; recognizing the Jewish Sabbath as the official day of rest;
promising public institutions will provide Kosher food; and ensuring
autonomous educational systems to ultra-orthodox communities.234
Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE – MUSIC – TEXT 142
(Stephen Heath trans., 1977). Note that Barak does not support the death of the
author overtly: “Formal democracy does not require absolute severance of the statute
from its author. Such severance is not only impossible, in light of the organic
relationship between legislature and statute—it is also undesirable.” BARAK,
PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 281. It is thus his critics who level
that accusation against him, for alongside this argument from “formal democracy,”
he also offers an argument from “substantive democracy,” according to which the
system’s fundamental values must come into interpretive consideration as well. Id. at
281–82. Per PO, the latter undermines the former.
231
Supra text accompanying note 43.
232
Criticism of originalism is often formulated by reference to the control
of prior generations’ “dead hand” over contemporary society. Samaha, Dead Hand,
supra note 177.
233
Justice Sohlberg applied PI in a case he defined as “easy,” citing Gini as
a counter-example, where he found no tension between the objective and the
subjective purposes and no deeply held public values on the line. CA 10159/16 Yoav
Regional Council v. Kiryat Gat Municipality (June 20, 2019), ¶ 27 (Sohlberg, J.),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
6\590\101\o14&fileName=16101590.O14&type=4 [Hebrew].
234
See Daphne Barak-Erez, Law and Religion under the Status Quo Model: Between
Compromises and Constant Change, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2495 (2009); PATRICIA J.
WOODS, JUDICIAL POWER AND NATIONAL POLITICS: COURTS AND GENDER IN THE
RELIGIOUS-SECULAR CONFLICTS IN ISRAEL 36 (2008); Natan Lerner, Religious Liberty
in the State of Israel, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 239, 250 (2007). In both Gini and
Association of Merchants, Justice Sohlberg sided with the religious institutions’
230
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Some scholars argue that the “status quo letter” sent from the states’
leaders to the religious ones, containing these details, is “a founding
fathers agreement.”235 PO similarly seems to view the legal regimes
grounded in this arrangement as a “small ‘c’ constitution,”236 not
without reason. It does not enjoy lesser public consensus than the
human rights Basic Laws and it played an actual role in Israeli nationbuilding—it is more original, as a genuine chronological origin—despite
not having any formal normative status, let alone superiority.237 Instead
of using principles enshrined in the Basic Laws as interpretive devices,
Sohlberg uses those of ‘the status quo’ agreement, at least when
deciding cases involving the “Jewish and democratic” character of the
state.238 As the statutes considered in PO cases also preceded the Basic
Laws chronologically, PO thereby challenges the role of the savings
clause precluding retroactive review. Currently, Israeli judges try, as
Rivka Weill explains, “to minimize its anachronistic effects on society
[ . . . the savings clause is] treated as a problematic, undesired, but
necessary compromise tool.”239 But PO resembles the treatment of
such clauses in countries “that glorify the past,” since it treats protected
laws “as a benchmark for interpreting the constitution” rather than the

interests, and so it is worth mentioning that Justice Sohlberg is religiously observant,
as are the other Justices on the panels who reached the same results, although
disputing Sohlberg’s reasonings (Rubinstein in Gini and Hendel in Association of
Merchants). There is a high correlation between religious identity and rulings on
religious liberty issues in the Supreme Court of Israel. This is in contrast to all other
political issues, where personal identity has very low bearing on judicial outcomes
relative to the Supreme Courts of the United States, Canada, India, and the
Philippines. Keren Weinshall et al., Ideological Influences on Governance and Regulation: The
Comparative Case of Supreme Courts, 12 REG. & GOVERNANCE 334 (2018).
235
SHETREET & HOMOLKA, supra note 11, at 342.
236
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 190; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
237
If this is true, it suggests an interesting rhetoric reversal of Fontana’s
argument that originalism goes hand in hand with “revolutionary” rather than
“reorganizational” constitutions. Supra note 181. For ‘the status quo,’ despite its
name, is construed as a revolutionary moment, whereas the Constitutional
Revolution, despite its name, is construed as a reorganizational one.
238
For a normative proposal in this spirit, see SHETREET & HOMOLKA, supra
note 11, at 343. See also Hanna Lerner, Entrenching the Status-Quo: Religion and State in
Israel’s Constitutional Proposals, 16 CONSTELLATIONS 445 (2009).
239
Weill, Bills of Rights, supra note 17, at 329–30.
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other way around.240 Yet it would be a mistake to think of the ‘the
status quo’ as fixed in time. In fact, it is no less a dynamic framework
than the Basic Laws, and the compromises it enshrines are in constant
legal flux.241 In practice, the idealization of the status quo via the
savings clause is therefore an active, socially sensitive judicial pursuit—
just like originalist interpretations of the U.S. Constitution.242
Bright-Line Rules: that “liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence
of doubt”243 means that to honor the law is to promote stability,
predictability, and certainty. This quote originally referred to the
conservative principle of stare decisis, yet the same holds true for the
scope and specificity of the norms produced by stable, continuous
adjudication. A strictly rule-bound decision-making stabilizes not only
because standards open a space for ambiguity and hence indeterminacy
and contestation, but also by obstructing fundamental challenges from
receiving serious consideration: “Rules force the future into the
categories of the past.”244 Moreover, formalist stability may disable
reactionary jurisprudential movements from overstating their case in
the form of a conservative counter-revolution.245 On top of that, in
PO’s case, it may account for the way the chronological aspect of
ultimate purpose construction is accommodated: social evolution
needs to have reached a conclusive stage, such that no further public
turmoil is expected. Both the social and the legal status quos deserve
reverence.
Indeed, Sohlberg explicitly endorses formalism, as did Scalia,246
and claims it is currently lacking. “Now is the time for a moderate
return to a more formal law,” per Sohlberg, because “formalism is
necessary for jurists to navigate the labyrinth of the law [ . . . ] to walk
safely, step by step. [ . . . ] purposive interpretation can sometimes leave

240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Id. at 330.
Infra note 411.
See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 151.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 834, 844 (1991).
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 542 (1988).
See Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 127, at 1186.
Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 170.
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a space of vagueness, and its result is uncertainty.”247 And he kept true
to his word in designing PO in practice. PI is very inclusive with
respect to interpretive devices, offering a method of balancing and
synthesizing them into an ultimate purpose: legislative history, plain
meaning analysis, fundamental values, the legislature’s intent, canons
of construction—all are welcome.248 Substituting this reliance on
judicial discretion and open-ended standards with a rule-andexceptions model,249 and the Barakian normative framework with an
empirical one,250 bright-line rules lead PO to clear and predictable
resolutions to interpretive disputes.
Deference: “The key word,” writes Justice Sohlberg in Association
of Merchants, is “balance.”251 That is true for Barak as well, but for him
balance denotes expert judges weighing legally protected rights and
interests. For Sohlberg, by contrast, balance stands for democratic
representatives reaching political compromises, which judges respect
and validate. In said case, Sohlberg accepted the exclusion of
entertainment venues from the prohibition to operate on the Sabbath,
but not supermarkets, because this differentiation was a politically
convenient status quo.252 The realization that legislative process is
driven by political compromise led Scalia to deem legislative history
Noam Sohlberg, Keep the Law and Do Justice, 8 DIN UDVARIM 13, 18–19
(2014) [Hebrew]; see also CA 8146/13 Jusha v. Aldajani Hospital (in liquidation) (July
21,
2016),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
3\460\081\g11&fileName=13081460_g11.txt&type=4 [Hebrew]. In this case, the
majority ruled that a hospital owes a duty of care to the doctors who work in it, to
ensure they have a professional liability insurance, explicitly drawing on American
legal realism. Id. ¶ 2 (Hendel, J., concurring). Justice Sohlberg dissented, exhibiting
another kind of formalism by objecting to the blurring of traditional boundaries
between different legal doctrines (contracts and torts).
248
For a critical assessment of such inclinations, see Adam M. Samaha,
Looking over a Crowd—Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 554 (2017).
249
Supra notes 102–112 and accompanying text; see also Sohlberg, On
Subjective Values, supra note 63, at 42.
250
Supra note 93 and accompanying text.
251
Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶ 33 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting)
(emphasis removed).
252
Id. ¶¶ 28–33 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). See also supra note 241, infra note
411 and accompanying texts.
247
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impermissible, since judges are bound only by the purpose as and when
it was given textual form.253 The very same reason and same vision of
judge-legislator division of labor leads Sohlberg to invite legislative
history in: the text is the end product, of both the legislative and the
interpretive processes.254 Ending the empirical quest at the moment of
enactment sets Sohlberg apart from liberals in both jurisdictions who
view meaning as dynamic and evolving. It purports to express ultimate
respect for the democratic representatives of the people. Sohlberg
believes, like Scalia did regarding constitutional cases, that considering
historical material only strengthens these commitments.
Deference asks not what the meaning of a term is, but who
gets to decide.255 Deference cements PO’s majoritarian view of
democracy, in line with American conservatism. It does so by
predicating political legitimacy on past generations’ consent and by
putting hurdles in the way of non-legislative social progress, in a prima
facie objective and neutral manner.
Finally, deference may also contribute to understanding which
are the cases that require PO’s treatment most acutely: those that deal
with issues voters care deeply about, to the extent that they may play a
role in their voting deliberations. Hence, they demand of the judge
stringent adherence to representatives’ value judgments and rigorous
engagement with original legislative intents.

253
See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 33 (2006).
254
Supra notes 84–107 and accompanying text. The only case to date in
which Sohlberg struck down a statute was due to a faulty legislative process: it was
enacted in such a haste that MKs had not had an opportunity to participate. HCJ
10042/16 Kventinsky v. The Knesset (Aug. 6, 2017), available at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
6\420\100\o23&fileName=16100420_o23.txt&type=4 [Hebrew]; a summary of
the
case
in
English
is
available
at
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Quintinsky%20v
.%20Knesset%20%28summary%29.pdf. From a PO perspective, this first-ever
procedural invalidation of a statute makes perfect sense, because original intent,
unlike purpose, cannot formulate absent a proper legislative process in which
legislators take part.
255
Sanford Levinson, Consensus, Dissensus, and Constitutionalism, in ISRAELI
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING, supra note 8, at 59, 67.
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***
The combination of originalism, bright-line rules and
deference makes good sense to judicial conservatives in Israel just as it
did to American ones in the 1980s. The following reasons are provided
by Justice Sohlberg for according conclusive weight to original intent
as manifested in legislative history:
“Common sense (because the creator of a norm is best
positioned to testify as to its purpose); [ . . . ] separation
of powers (since the legislative branch creates the law,
and the judge’s role is to validate the legislature’s
creation); [ . . . ] objectivity and neutrality of the judicial
act (which is not guided by the judge’s subjective
thoughts about proper policy, but rather by the view
and the decision of the legislature); promotion of legal
certainty and the ability to predict the interpretation of
the norm (and hence equal operation of the law).”256
These principles guiding the proposed interpretive reform are
no less revealing than its methodological details, for they connote
broader ideological ideals. If Barak asserts that the constitutional
scheme authorizes the judge to give a statute the best possible meaning
via interpretation, Sohlberg understands separation of powers as
limiting judicial discretion to mere validation. This stands in sharp
contrast to Barak’s view that “the judge is a junior partner in the
legislative project,”257 but not the other way around. Sohlberg pulls the
judge out of the legislative process and brings the legislature into the
judicial one. Accordingly, where Barak grants the judge the capacity to
extract objective principles underpinning the legal system, Sohlberg
warns of “the subjective thoughts of the judge”—this casts doubt over
the whole idea of “the system’s intent:” both intents are subjective, the
question is only if we favor the legislature’s subjectivity or the
judge’s.258 In Justice Sohlberg’s own words in Rom, “there is no
advantage to the values we hold, as judges, over the values held by any
Gini II, supra note 62, ¶ 9 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting) (emphases removed).
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 285.
258
Sohlberg, On Subjective Values, supra note 63, at 42, 52–53. See also Posner,
supra note 61; Bork, supra note 61, at 128; Fish, supra note 61.
256
257
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other person.”259 Lastly, Barak’s injection of constitutional rights like
equality into the interpretive process, is reduced by Sohlberg to fair
application of the legislature’s will, whatever its content.260
PO puts an American conservative mirror in front of the
liberal judicial mainstream. On the methodological front, it favors
empirical over normative considerations, giving specific primacy to
legislative history, because it searches for the original intent of the
legislature. On the hermeneutic front, it views the meaning of the text
as fixed to the time of its enactment. On the democratic front, it favors
majoritarianism, which requires judicial deference and restraint via
categorical rules and conclusiveness. On the epistemological front, it
is skeptical about judges’ rationality, and possibly about human
rationality at large. And on the policy front, it favors religious over
other liberties and strives to preserve the social status quo, infused with
a reasonable dose of idealization.261 Instead of “bridg[ing] the gap
between law and the needs of society,”262 interpretation’s role is to keep
things as they are.
2. Between Law and Politics: Judicial Appointments
While PI idealizes the judge and her interpretative endeavor
(and hence is only nostalgic for the future), PO idealizes the
representative and her legislative process as the best articulator of
those values deeply rooted in the nation’s history.263 Its understanding
of tradition maneuvers between conflicting commitments to preserve
and to react: keep things steady and return them to the time before the
revolution.264 In the political arena, the latter route is preferred.
Rom, supra note 76, ¶ 10 (Sohlberg, J., concurring).
See also Jabareen, supra note 12, at 431 (per originalism, “legitimacy is
equated to validity and not to rights”).
261
Supra notes 238–241 and accompanying text.
262
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 42.
263
This is in line with American originalism despite taking place in the
legislative realm. See Shinar, Idealism and Realism, supra note 185, at 260; Daphne
Barak-Erez, History and Memory in Constitutional Adjudication, 45 FED. L. REV. 1, 9–11
(2017); supra note 192 and accompanying text.
264
The turn in the Court’s jurisprudence has been given different names,
depending on which element is emphasized: the legal revolution (FRIEDMANN, supra
note 11, at 54–56); the constitutional revolution (supra note 18); the interpretive
259
260
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Diligently pursuing a counter-revolution is Ayelet Shaked: a leading
figure in a coalition of right-wing parties who served as Minister of
Justice in the years 2015–2019. According to a 2018 profile, “even her
fiercest detractors admit that she is the most effective player currently
operating in Israel’s roiling political arena.”265 Her number one priority
as Minister was judicial appointments.266 In filling judicial vacancies,
Shaked’s goal was, in her own words, “to return the court to its
paramount objective: interpreting the legislative branch’s norms rather
than supplanting them”267 by appointing “conservative judges who will
influence rulings according to their positions.”268 To oppose Barak’s
legacy has generated political capital for prior ministers of justice and
other politicians as well. Shaked’s statements are nonetheless telling,
because they reveal a change in the right-wing view of governance as
regards the judiciary. Not only did she seek to diversify the bench,
claiming it is a closed clique of like-minded jurists who share similar
backgrounds,269 nor were her misgivings of a strictly jurisprudential

revolution (Kedar, supra note 24); the human rights revolution (ASSAF MEYDANI, THE
ISRAELI SUPREME COURT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION: COURTS AS
AGENDA SETTERS (2011)).
265
Yonit Levi, The Woman Who Could Be Israel’s Next Leader, ATLANTIC (Oct.
9, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/10/netanyahuchallenger-ayelet-shaked/572320. Shaked was also ranked first on the leading
economic magazine TheMarker’s list of the most influential people in Israel for 2018.
Ido Baum, 100 Most Influential 2018, #1 Ayelet Shaked: Minister of Justice, THEMARKER
(2018), https://www.themarker.com/EXT-INTERACTIVE-1.6430642 [Hebrew].
266
Omri Assenheim, Game of Thrones, UVDA, Nov. 22, 2017, available at
http://www.mako.co.il/tv-ilana_dayan/2017/Article-8a19b6c5884ef51006.htm
[Hebrew].
267
Tova Tzimuki, Two New Justices Selected for Supreme Court, YNET (Feb. 22,
2018), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5126945,00.html; see also
Jonathan Tepperman, Ministering Justice: A Conversation with Ayelet Shaked, 95 FOREIGN
AFF. 2, 5 (2016).
268
Tal Schneider, “Shaked: ‘These Elections are a Challenge for the Right. I will
Probably
Run,’”
GLOBES
(June
16,
2019),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001289769 [Hebrew].
269
An empirical study on the social composition of the Israeli judiciary
found that various minorities are indeed under-represented among judges, but one
minority that is over-represented is religious Zionism. Alon Jasper, A Place at the
Table: On the Social Composition of the Israeli Judiciary 46–52, 80–82 (Sept., 2018)
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Tel Aviv University) (on file with author) [Hebrew].
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nature or driven by personal animosity.270 Rather, she framed her
desirable judiciary in blunt political terms, taking pride in putting “on
the table” the possibility of engaging in a debate between liberal and
conservative judges, like the one raging in the U.S.271 More than a call
for judges to exercise restraint and stay out of the political game, her
conservative agenda seeks to substitute one ideological elite with
another; institute a new hegemony on the ruins of a former one.272 The
idea of social hierarchy is not rejected, only different people are put at
the top. And the tool for their ascent is interpretive methodology.
This is significant because judges have no political affiliation in
Israel. The judicial appointment process is far less political than the
American one,273 done by a committee comprising representatives of
all branches of government as well as the Bar.274 True, the Court’s
growing involvement in political questions since the 1980s, primarily
due to the practical erosion of the justiciability and standing
doctrines,275 has resulted in political attempts to curtail its
independence and arguably in a decline of public trust.276 This includes
the appointment process becoming, since the 1990s, a matter of
controversy that draws attention to the social identities of the selected
judges,277 and increasingly so in recent years.278 Still, judges are generally
Jurisprudential and personal differences characterize the attitude of
former Minister of Justice, Professor Daniel Friedmann, to the Barak Court.
Ginsburg, supra note 22; MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF
ISRAEL 167 (2011). Friedmann attempted during his tenure (2007–2009) to
implement various agendas promoted by conservative intellectual circles, with
limited success. Id. at 170.
271
Schneider, supra note 268.
272
See Maya Mark, Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue, 2 TELEM 20, 22 (2019),
available at https://telem.berl.org.il/394/ [Hebrew]. See also, on the demise of the
liberal hegemony in Israel, infra notes 400–406 and accompanying text.
273
Supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text.
274
See NAVOT 2007, supra note 65, at 146.
275
See Elad Gil, Judicial Answer to Political Question: The Political Question Doctrine
in the United States and Israel, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 245 (2014). See also supra note 58.
276
Id. at 275–76; MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL, supra note
270, at 169.
277
Jasper, supra note 269, at 48–52; FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 317.
278
See Lahav Harkov, Sex, Judges and Politics: Will Latest Scandal Hurt Shaked?,
JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Sex-judgesand-politics-Will-latest-scandal-hurt-Shaked-577647; Revital Hovel, Israeli Judicial
270
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not considered partisan figures, including by proxy of appointer; the
Court is generally guided by a uniform professional ethos; it enjoys
higher rates of public trust than most state institutions; 279 and the
judicial branch has actively taken various institutional steps to distance
itself from the political arena.280 The current move, by contrast, marks
judges being appointed as belonging to one of two opposed ideological
camps, which correlate with the ones on the political map, and
interpretation is the litmus test. Finally, what is striking about Shaked’s
campaign is that unlike previous attacks on the Supreme Court, it was
successful.
Reminiscent of the Reagan administration in setting judicial
appointments as the top of the agenda, communicating it to the public
as a matter of political urgency, Shaked diligently scrutinized potential
nominees to ascertain their world-views.281 She was fortunate to have
six out of fifteen Supreme Court Justices retire during her tenure,282
and therefore presided over the selections of over a third of the current
composition of Court, cementing a lasting impact. The new Justices
have not defied expectations, penning opinions on stricter standing

Committee Member Plays Ethnic Card, HAARETZ (Aug. 15, 2015),
https://www.haaretz.com/judicial-c-tee-member-plays-ethnic-card-1.5386998.
279
TAMAR HERMANN ET AL., THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX 2019:
SELECT FINDINGS 4 (2020), https://en.idi.org.il/media/13847/summary-the-israelidemocracy-index-2019-en.pdf; Shinar, Accidental Constitutionalism, supra note 19, at
227–29.
280
See Jasper, supra note 269, at 19–24.
281
Assenheim, supra note 266; Nahum Barnea & Tova Tzimuki, “During My
Tenure Democracy has Gotten Stronger,” YEDIOTH AHRONOTH (Weekend Supplement,
Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5342457,00.html
[Hebrew]. Accordingly, Shaked has vetoed the promotion to the Supreme Court of
a celebrated district court judge, whose husband had been associated with a civil
rights NGO, on “political-ideological” grounds (words of Efi Nave, former Head of
the Israeli Bar Association who sat with Shaked on the judicial nominations
committee. Assenheim, supra).
282
The statutory retirement age for Judges in Israel, in all instances, is 70.
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rights;283 increased deference to the executive;284 non-interference in
religious courts’ rulings, no matter their infringement on rights;285 overt
skepticism regarding the competence and efficiency of various
bureaucratic structures;286 non-justiciability of foreign relations,
invoking the American political question doctrine;287 harsh sentencing
283
LPA-App 8411/16 Sela v. Israel Prison Service (July 17, 2018), ¶¶ 15–25
(Mintz,
J.,
dissenting),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
6\110\084\n15&fileName=16084110.N15&type=4 [Hebrew].
284
CA 7488/16 Seligman v. Phoenix Insurance Company Ltd. (May 31,
2018),
¶
40
(Willner,
J.),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
6\880\074\r18&fileName=16074880.R18&type=4 [Hebrew] (ruling that when a
regulator’s interpretation of its own rules is reasonable, “the default would be to
adopt this position”) (a further hearing of the case by an extended panel has been
ordered, CFH 4960/18, and is currently pending; last checked May 26, 2020). In a
later decision, Justice Willner explicitly framed this reasoning as Chevron deference, HCJ
2875/18 Association of Foreign Manpower in Construction Corporations v.
Government of Israel (June 18, 2019), ¶¶ 27–28 (Willner, J.), available at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
8\750\028\r10&fileName=18028750.R10&type=4 [Hebrew]. For conservative
justifications of Chevron, see Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 127, at 1199;
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511.
285
HCJ 4602/13 Jane Doe v. Regional Rabbinic Court Haifa (Nov. 18,
2018),
¶
1
(Stein,
J.),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
3\020\046\e13&fileName=13046020.E13&type=4 [Hebrew]; see also Yehuda
Yifrach, Israeli Ninja: The Refreshing Audacity of Justice Stein, MAKOR RISHON (Nov. 24,
2018), https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinion/94181/ [Hebrew].
286
AAA 6525/17 Sanlakol Ltd. v. Jezreel Valley Regional Council (Nov. 8,
2018),
¶¶
18–25,
32
(Stein,
J.),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
7\250\065\f08&fileName=17065250.F08&type=4 [Hebrew]; CApp 5894/18
Menora Mivtachim Insurance Ltd. v. Lehavot Vesherutim Ltd. (Aug. 19 2018),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
8\940\058\f02&fileName=18058940.F02&type=4 [Hebrew].
287
HCJ 8542/18 Ackerman v. Government of Israel (Dec. 9, 2018), available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
8\420\085\f01&fileName=18085420.F01&type=4 [Hebrew]; a summary of the
case in English is available at http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/viewpoints/recentdevelopments-israeli-law-4.
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resting on an over-emphasis on general deterrence;288 and even
lowering the standards for granting the necessity defense to antiterrorism interrogators, in a decision some claim amounts to
legitimation of torture.289 As Shaked put it, “the entire right-wing, and
certainly religious Zionism and the whole conservative camp, can no
longer complain about being underrepresented.”290
A Shaked appointee who joined the Court in 2018 and merits
special attention is Justice Alex Stein. A law professor who had left
Israel in 2004 for an academic career in the U.S., yet continued to
produce right-of-center commentary on Israeli affairs,291 he was sought
after by Shaked’s aides thanks to his reputation as a conservative
jurist.292 It was not long before the American interpretive debate
resurfaced, when Justice Stein favorably invoked textualism in a 2019
concurrence. Citing Scalia and Garner,293 Stein advocated an approach
that “looks for the meaning of the legislated edict as a matter of
empirical fact [ . . . ] only when the language is unclear should the
interpreter consider the purpose of the statute and the legislative

CrimA 4802/18 John Doe v. State of Israel (Jan. 29, 2019), ¶¶ 34–35
(Stein,
J.),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
8\020\048\f11&fileName=18048020.F11&type=4 [Hebrew].
289
HCJ 9018/17 Tbeish v. Attorney General (Nov. 26, 2018), available at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
7\180\090\j11&fileName=17090180.J11&type=4 [Hebrew], English translation
available
at
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Tbeish%20v.%2
0Attorney%20General.pdf. For criticism, see Smadar Ben-Natan, Revise Your Syllabi:
Israeli Supreme Court Upholds Authorization for Torture and Ill-Treatment, 10 J. INT’L
HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 41 (2019).
290
Levi, supra note 265.
291
Netael Bandel, Right Honorable, MAKOR RISHON (Dec. 16, 2018),
https://www.makorrishon.co.il/magazine/dyukan/100103/ [Hebrew]; Avishai
Grinzeig, Warrior Against the Revolution, CHANNEL 7 (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/367447 [Hebrew].
292
Ido Baum & Bini Aschkenasy, Ayelet Shaked’s Man for Special Operations
Reveals: This is How We Appointed Judges, THEMARKER (July 19, 2019),
https://www.themarker.com/law/.premium-1.7539383 [Hebrew].
293
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1.
288
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history.”294 Additionally, he opined that at least some specific types of
texts, presidential clemency decisions, must be interpreted according
to their original public meaning, citing American originalists like
Professor Solum. Justice Stein thereby referred to the concept of
objective purpose with overt skepticism, denying its relevance
altogether when dealing with such texts.295 Indeed, in a case of statutory
interpretation, Stein ignored the concept of purpose altogether,
examining solely language and intent. Asking whether an antidiscrimination mandate on private parties who provide a “product”
applies to apartment renting, Stein reached the radical conclusion that
such an interpretation would “cross the boundaries of the language.”296
In ordinary language use, he reasoned, “product” refers only to
personal rather than real property; and the legislative history, which
Stein seems to deem informative of the semantic meaning itself,
suggests that lawmakers intended to exclude real property from the
statute’s scope.297
Justice Stein supported his approach with reasons very similar
to the ones Justice Sohlberg listed,298 but he has yet to develop an
elaborate interpretive argument. Still, in assessing the growing
influence of American conservative jurisprudence over Israel, this is a
pivotal addition to PO. It seems that the combination of PO with
LAA-App 2283/18 Local Planning and Construction Council Tel Aviv
v. Yad Harutzim Properties Ltd (Jan. 1, 2019), ¶ 4 (Stein, J., concurring), available at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
8\830\022\a11&fileName=18022830.A11&type=4 [Hebrew].
295
LPA-App 534/19 Ziada v. State of Israel (Aug. 20, 2019), ¶¶ 45–50
(Stein,
J.),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
9\340\005\f06&fileName=19005340.F06&type=4 [Hebrew].
296
LCA-App 10011/17 Mei-Tal Engineering and Services Ltd. v. Salman
(Aug.
19,
2019),
¶
9
(Stein,
J.,
concurring),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
7\110\100\b18&fileName=17100110.B18&type=4 [Hebrew].
297
Id. ¶¶ 3–9 (Stein, J., concurring) (cf. a similar move by Justice Sohlberg,
supra note 84). The ultimate outcome of the case was nonetheless that such
discrimination is forbidden, although the general scope of the ruling remains unclear
owing to Justice Stein’s reasoning that is external to the anti-discrimination statute.
298
Id. ¶ 6 (Stein, J., concurring); Ziada, supra note 295, ¶¶ 45–50 (Stein, J.);
Yad Harutzim, supra note 294 ¶ 4 (Stein, J., concurring); supra text accompanying
note 256.
294
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Minister Shaked’s campaign has opened the floodgates of interpretive
contestation.299 While Stein is more akin to American conservative
judges in being unapologetic, at times scathing, Sohlberg is more
conservative.300 For he favors an incremental, moderate approach rather
than a counter-revolution. A lecture delivered shortly after he was
appointed to the Supreme Court is titled “Keep the Law” 301—to honor
is also to preserve, and purism, methodological or otherwise, is in
tension with safeguarding a state of affairs just by virtue of its preexistence.302
“For the first time,” states a prominent cause lawyer, “we have
stopped evaluating judges professionally and analyzing them with legal
tools, and have started evaluating them according to their worldview.”303 Conservatism is a judicial force to be reckoned with. It is only
natural that Justice Sohlberg is its torchbearer. Set to become the
Court’s president in 2028,304 an expectation that he would lead the way
to a conservative jurisprudence had already been present in relevant
political circles.305 This is but one reason why PO would be difficult to
dissociate from conservative political ideology. Another one is that
although Justice Sohlberg was appointed to the Supreme Court in the
See also supra note 284, infra note 422 and accompanying text.
Sohlberg identified himself as a conservative thus: “I plead guilty to this
label attached to me [ . . . ] conservatism is quite a natural thing in the world of law [
. . . ] as a religious man of faith I don’t encounter many revolutions.” Itzik Wolff,
Sohlberg on the AG Debate: There is Room for Change, NEWS1 (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.news1.co.il/Archive/001-D-407661-00.html [Hebrew].
301
Sohlberg, Keep the Law, supra note 247 (the lecture was published in 2014
but delivered in October 2012, id., at 13); Sohlberg began his tenure as Supreme
Court Justice in February 2012.
302
It is also more difficult for methodological purists to be appointed to the
Israeli bench, due to the procedure’s character. Infra section III.B.2.
303
Bini Aschkenasy, Has Ayelet Shaked Succeeded to Revolutionize the Supreme
Court?, THEMARKER (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.themarker.com/law/.premium1.6917440 [Hebrew].
304
The President of the Court is appointed from among its members,
according to seniority. See SHETREET & HOMOLKA, supra note 11, at 115.
305
Bandel, supra note 291 (“Those who favor legal conservatism look to the
year 2028, when Sohlberg is expected to take the President’s seat”). This is not to say
that there is empirical evidence that any such expectation affects Justice Sohlberg’s
decisions, and he expresses no ardor as regards his expected presidency. Wolff, supra
note 300.
299
300
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same year Shaked entered national politics, 2012, 306 it is only after she
had assumed the role of Minister of Justice that PO emerged.
Furthermore, Justice Sohlberg identified himself with the political
Right in 2017. The President of the Court had decided that no
representative of the judicial branch would attend a ceremony
commemorating fifty years of Israeli control over, and settlement in,
the West Bank, due to the politically controversial nature of the event.
Sohlberg, a settler, attended nonetheless “as a private citizen.”307 His
setting himself outside of judicial mainstream echoes in PO as well. He
expressed dry irony in Association of Merchants, writing: “we will not
paint [the disagreement] in stark colors; this is not ‘religious’ versus
‘secular’, not ‘north’ versus ‘south’ nor the periphery versus ‘the state
of Tel-Aviv.’”308 The very inclusion of this sentence in the opinion
conveys the opposite message of the plain text, planting doubts in the
reader’s mind regarding the other Justices’ biases. The most plausible
audience for this message is the layperson, with whom PO seeks to
communicate directly, as Scalia’s textualism does.309 Specifically, the
one who resides in the heartland and desires recognition of his
remoteness from the concentrated elite.
3. As Political Ideology
a. Constructing a Conservative Identity
No political figure emblemizes the emerging Israeli
conservatism better than the same Ayelet Shaked. Not only because of

Ayelet Shaked ran her first primaries campaign in 2012, and was sworn
as MK in January 2013.
307
Chen Maanit, What Happens When a Supreme Court Justice Suddenly “Turns
into”
a
Private
Person,
GLOBES
(Oct.
3,
2017),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001207141 [Hebrew].
308
Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶ 37 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
“The State of Tel-Aviv” is a familiar trope denoting an ostensible gap between the
liberal city and the rest of the country. Similarly, the city’s residents are often depicted
as “sushi eaters,” and Sohlberg alludes to this as well when he imagines why TelAvivians are so keen on having supermarkets open on the Sabbath—so that they
could buy “milk and eggs and soy sauce.” Id. ¶ 31 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting).
309
Supra note 167 and accompanying text.
306
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her political stature and the bright future predicted to her,310 but also
because she has published a “manifesto” laying down her governance
world-view.311 It is a perfect illustration of how Israeli conservatism
has embraced all the major tenets of American conservatism, inner
contradictions included, and is trying to consolidate them into a whole
bigger than the sum of its parts, within the Israeli context. The text has
three foci: legislation; the judiciary; and the definition of Israel as a
Jewish and democratic state.
Any legislative act, Shaked holds, is in and of itself an
infringement on people’s liberty: “every time the legislature chooses to
express confidence in a new normative mechanism [ . . . it] is a vote of
no confidence in our ability as individuals and communities to conduct
ourselves well enough without the state determining the course of our
lives [ . . . ] a vote of no confidence in the power of families.”312 This
approach echoes, on the one hand, the neo-liberal, economic
conservatism of self-governance by isolated individuals rather than
central state authorities, equating deregulation with promotion of
freedom; and, on the other hand, the social conservative emphasis on
time-honored institutions superior to the state, particularly the family.
The link between the two kinds of conservatism is strengthened when
Shaked quotes Milton Friedman, who framed the Jewish tradition as
one of self-reliance, leading Shaked to conclude that “the values of
freedom”—as Friedman understood them—”were the hallmark of our
people during two thousand years of exile.”313 The result is a call for
significant reduction in the number of laws passed by the Knesset, in
order to let the free market roam. Incidentally, the raison d’être of
Israel—whose national ethos was originally of a collectivist, socialist
Allison Kaplan Sommer, How Ayelet Shaked Became the Most Powerful
Woman in Israeli Politics, HAARETZ (July 30, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/elections/.premium-how-ayelet-shaked-became-the-most-powerful-womanin-israeli-politics-1.7605086; Ben Caspit, Who Stands in the Way of Israel’s Shaked
Premiership?,
AL-MONITOR
(June
7,
2019),
https://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/06/israel-netanyahu-sara-likud-ayelet-shakedveto-new-right.html#ixzz5qNOdEr3s); supra note 265 and accompanying text.
311
Ayelet Shaked, The Path to Democracy and Governance, 1 HASHILOACH 37
(2016) [Hebrew], English translation available at https://hashiloach.org.il/pathdemocracy-governance.
312
Id. at 38.
313
Id. at 40.
310
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mold314—is reimagined as one of a night-watchman state. Upon
establishment of sovereignty, so Shaked’s story goes, the collective
delegated its self-reliance values to the communities, families and
individuals therein.315
Moving to the judiciary, Shaked exhibits a heavily
Americanized understanding of separation of powers. Describing it as
a “power struggle,” she quotes Alexander Hamilton on the Court not
holding the sword or the purse,316 thus portraying it as a constraint on
both the economy and national security. Here the substantive
conservatisms are joined by an institutional one: similarly to Sohlberg,
Shaked speaks of “preventing future collisions” by way of judicial
deference to the other branches. For her, judicial review is nothing
more than policy making by unelected judges, irrespective of the legal
standards that govern it. In contrast to the Federalist Papers, Shaked
takes no notice of the possibility of a law superior to legislation,

314
The Israeli national ethos has been undergoing a process of increasing
neo-liberalization since the 1980s. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, Israel’s ‘Constitutional
Revolution:’ The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal
Economic Order, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 427 (1998) (framing the Constitutional Revolution
as a legal facilitation of neo-liberalism; under this light, the current political Right
builds on a foundation laid down by the Court itself). Still, Shaked’s rhetoric is
extreme both in its simplicity and in its absolutism. Prime Minister Netanyahu, for
example, who has championed neo-liberalism in Israel, is generally more careful to
justify promotion of free market policies by appealing to collectivist, militaristic and
technological needs for national strength, facilitated by a stable economy. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Netanyahu, “Ben Gurion, We are Moving Up the Mountain”, MAKOR RISHON
(Apr. 10, 2018), available at https://bit.ly/2IML0k2 [Hebrew]. See also, on Netanyahu,
infra notes 346–357 and accompanying text.
315
One way this translates into policy is Shaked’s unprecedented decision to
allocate funds to private courts that resolve civil disputes according to Jewish Law.
Bini Aschkenasy, Shaked: I funded Courts that Adjudicate According to Jewish Law,
HAARETZ (June 12, 2019), https://www.haaretz.co.il/tmr/1.7363251 [Hebrew];
Mark, supra note 272, at 30.
316
Shaked, supra note 311, at 44–47. This metaphor was previously
highlighted by a former Minister of Justice, whose footsteps Shaked follows in
opposing the legacy of Barak, Daniel Friedmann. FRIEDMANN, supra note 11 (the
book appeared originally in Hebrew in 2013); see also supra note 270.
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whether establishing checks and balances or a bill of rights. 317 The only
exception is the Jewish nature of the state.318
Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state is the third topic of the
article. Again, Shaked turns to American inspiration: Thomas Jefferson
and Abraham Lincoln as well as John Locke.319 Shaked stipulates that
these figures’ views on democracy actually stemmed from the Jewish
tradition, which had introduced “the model of separation of powers
thousands of years ago.”320 Ergo, enhancing the state’s Jewish
character will automatically promote its democratic one. Democracy is
not only an outcome of Jewish tradition, but specifically one which
holds that “nothing is more just or correct than the decision of the
people and its representatives.” Judicial restraint is nothing short of a
rabbinic imperative.321 This view is contrasted with that of Barak’s,
who “effectively turned the concept of a Jewish state into something
symbolic, a concept that exists only insofar as it is completely
consistent with the values of ‘democracy’—and a very specific version
of democracy at that.”322 Not only “very specific,” but inferior, because
317
See Yaniv Roznai, Who will Save the Redheads? Towards an Anti-Bully Theory
of Judicial Review and Protection of Democracy, 29 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming
2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488474, at 4 (“according to some
political and public views, democracy is fulfilled through elections and decisionmaking process[es] reflecting the majority’s will, and no more. Perhaps the best
example is reflected in the approach of Israel’s former Minister of Justice, Ayelet
Shaked”).
318
For concrete legal reforms in this spirit, see supra note 21 (making Jewish
Law a positive source for filling legislative lacunae); infra note 358 (enacting the Basic
Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People).
319
Shaked, supra note 311, at 51. Incidentally, the drafters of the Israeli
Declaration of Independence were indeed influenced by Jefferson. Yoram Shachar,
Jefferson Goes East: The American Origins of the Israeli Declaration of Independence, 10
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 589 (2009).
320
Shaked, supra note 311, at 51.
321
Id. at 54. This is very far from the truth, not only in the sense that the
Jewish tradition is not the source of democratic theory (see Haim Shapira, Majority
Rule in the Jewish Legal Tradition, 82 HEBREW UNION C. ANN. 161 (2012)), but also as
it is a tradition of judge-made law. Talmudic sages used broad judicial discretion, and
moreover incorporated considerations of political morality into their rulings, in a
quasi-Dworkinian fashion. MOSHE HALBERTAL, INTERPRETATIVE REVOLUTIONS
IN THE MAKING 186–90 (1997) [Hebrew].
322
Shaked, supra note 311, at 50.
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it did not genuinely incorporate the Jewish elements which make it a
better one.
For this former Minister of Justice, judicial activism means that
“the demos has been turned into a demon.”323 The American Right is
similarly reluctant to grant institutional authority to interpret the
abstract values enshrined in the constitution. For it amounts to a “rule
by judges,” which should be resisted because “[t]he tradition of this
political community cannot accept the proposition that the elite make
better decisions than the people.”324 Shaked is not alone in wedding a
“schoolyard rivalry” version of separation of powers325—yet without
constitutional protections, advocating an unchecked majority rule—
with the three conservative political strands: social, economic, and
national security. Following a broader assimilation of American culture
and values regardless of political ideology,326 the Israeli Right has been
increasingly borrowing various strategies and policies of Republican
politics, bringing right-wing closer to becoming synonymous with
conservatism of the American kind (even adopting the title “a
Republican party”327). Before exploring specific instances in sections
III.B.3.b–c below, it is important to consider the social backdrop for

Moshe Gorali, Supreme Court President Hayut: “Governance Is Not a Permit to
Break the Law;” Shaked: “The Demos has Been Turned into a Demon,” CALCALIST (Dec.
21, 2017), https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3727939,00.html
[Hebrew].
324
Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral
Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1538 (1989).
325
In the words of the President of the International Criminal Court, Judge
Chile Eboe-Osuji. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Defence
Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ¶ 385 (Eboe-Osuji, J.) (Apr. 5, 2016),
available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04384.PDF.
326
Cohn, supra note 20, at 23–24; Myron J. Aronoff, The “Americanization” of
Israeli Politics: Political and Cultural Change, 5 ISR. STUD. 92 (2000); Uri Ram, Citizens,
Consumers and Believers: The Israeli Public Sphere between Capitalism and Fundamentalism, 3
ISR. STUD. 24 (1998).
327
Time of Israel Staff, Pleading for Right-Wing Unity, Shaked Backs Off Key
Demand in Merger Talks, TIMES OF ISRAEL (July 25, 2019),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/pleading-for-right-wing-unity-shaked-backs-offdemand-in-merger-talks/ (“Establishing a right bloc is an urgent matter, a kind of
large republican party”).
323
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the emerging Israeli conservative movement, as a joint endeavor of
political and civil society forces.
After being dominated for decades by liberal motivations, the
map of civil society organizations and cause lawyering has changed:
“the Right has studied the methods of the Left. The civil arena is
important and must be played in. That is why in recent years right-wing
NGOs and think-tanks have emerged.”328 Many of them are funded by
American money, promote conservative ideas, and put legal issues at
the top of their agendas. A noteworthy organization is the American
fund Tikvah, which promotes a conservative agenda through multiple
avenues.329 Among the projects that Tikvah funds is the Hashiloach
magazine, which facilitates various intellectual efforts at reconciling the
Jewish tradition with Anglo-American conservative thought, including
Shaked’s treatise discussed above,330 as well as the only text published
by Justice Sohlberg for a wide, non-lawyer audience.331 Other projects
that have been financially supported by the fund include different
academic programs and seminars for students, scholars, and policymakers;332 a college built on the American liberal arts model, that
328

Barnea & Tzimuki, supra note 281 (quoting former minister Ayelet

Shaked).
Tikvah describes its philosophy thus: “In its political philosophy, the
Fund is Zionist. Economically, it supports the free market. Culturally, it tends
towards the traditional. In civilian and religious matters, it supports individual
freedom.” HASHILOACH, About https://hashiloach.org.il/about (last visited May 26,
2020). Full disclosure: the Tikvah fund contributed to a scholarship received by the
author as an undergraduate student at Tel Aviv University.
330
Supra note 311; see also Yoav Sorek, A Question of Identity, 14 HASHILOACH
43
(2019),
available
at
https://hashiloach.org.il/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/hashiloach-14-full-print.pdf
[Hebrew];
Benjamin
Schvarcz, To Speak Correctly about Democracy, 7 HASHILOACH 75 (2017), available at
https://hashiloach.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2-2-hashiloach_7shcwartz-web.pdf [Hebrew]; Nir Barkat, Nine Measures of Free Hand, 4 HASHILOACH
49
(2017),
available
at
https://hashiloach.org.il/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/hashiloach-4-ewb-1-barkat.pdf [Hebrew].
331
Sohlberg, On Subjective Values, supra note 63.
332
See Guy Liberman, A Fund from the Right, YEDIOTH AHRONOTH
(Weekend Supplement, Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L5073031,00.html [Hebrew]; Aviad Houminer, Religious Zionism: From Equality and
Social Justice to Ultra-Capitalism, 77 DEOT (Dec. 2016–Jan. 2017), available at
https://bit.ly/2Bh8NUI [Hebrew].
329
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centers on Jewish themes and sets as its purpose “to create visionary
leaders for the Jewish state and the Jewish people,” 333 as well as
publishes translations into Hebrew of prominent conservative thinkers
including Edmund Burke, Friedrich Hayek, and Leo Strauss; 334 a
separate publishing house for contemporary non-fiction books that
appeals to “an elite in construction” and aims at furthering “the
intellectual revolution of the conservative right-wing;”335 a website that
publishes op-eds and news from classical liberal or libertarian
perspectives drawing on Republican policies; 336 a legal forum expressly
inspired by The Federalist Society;337 and, most consequentially, the
think-tank Kohelet. Kohelet issues policy papers, lobbies lawmakers,
petitions the courts and submits amicus briefs, all advocating
conservative policies in various spheres like the economy, international
relations, immigration policy, and institutional design. 338 This thinktank also provides scholarships for Israelis to obtain an LL.M. degree
from the Antonin Scalia Law School of George Mayson University,
Talila Nesher, Supported by Saar, Shalem Center Gains Academic Recognition,
HAARETZ (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.1899517
[Hebrew]. The college evolved from “an American style conservative think-tank.”
Jonathan Rynhold, In Search of Israeli Conservatism, 7 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 199, 204
(2002).
334
The
full
catalogue
is
available
at
SHALEM
PRESS,
https://shalempress.co.il/ (last visited May 26, 2020).
335
Shibolet
Press,
About,
FACEBOOK
(OCT.
29,
2019),
https://www.facebook.com/shiboletpress/about/ [Hebrew].
336
See http://mida.org.il (last visited May 26, 2020) (the website’s name,
Mida, means both virtue and measure—two conservative values). For examples of
articles published on this website, see infra notes 350, 361. On its sources of funding,
see Hilo Glazer, Ethics and Politics According to Baratz, HAARETZ (May 9, 2018),
https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/.premium-MAGAZINE-1.6072595
[Hebrew].
337
See LEGAL FORUM FOR LAW AND LIBERTY, https://lawforum.org.il/
(last visited May 26, 2020).
338
See
KOHELET
POLICY
FORUM,
Policy
Papers,
https://en.kohelet.org.il/policy-papers (last visited May 26, 2020). For an example
of an amicus brief, see HCJ 8665/14 Desta v. Knesset (Aug. 11, 2015), ¶ 18 (Naor,
President),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
4\650\086\c15&fileName=14086650.C15&type=4 [Hebrew], English translation
available
at
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Desta%20v.%20
Knesset.pdf.
333
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known for its conservative orientation.339 Described as “one of the
most powerful and influential bodies in Israeli politics,” 340 Kohelet’s
chief economic director served as one of Minister Shaked’s advisors, 341
as did the head of another think-tank whose self-explanatory name is
The Ayn Rand Center.342
These and other efforts of similar veins help facilitate
conservatism as the go-to theory of the right-wing in Israel, which has
not always been the case. The equation of liberalism with the left-wing
is a recent paradigmatic shift,343 and the themes of conservatism have
not been traditionally dominant in Israeli politics in a unified form.344
The explanation provided by political science literature is that the
different parties define themselves primarily by their stance toward
Zionism, nationalism, and the Israeli-Arab conflict. This causes
Kohelet, The George Mayson LL.M. Program, https://bit.ly/2XBUx53
[Hebrew] (last visited May 26, 2020). On the law school’s political orientation, see
STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 182–83, 205–19 (2008).
340
Shuki Sade, 100 Most Influential 2018, #7 Meir Rubin: CEO of Kohelet Forum,
THEMARKER
(2018),
https://www.themarker.com/EXT-INTERACTIVE1.6430761 [Hebrew]. See also Rami Hod & Yonatan Levi, How Conservative American
Money Helped the Religious Right Take Over Israel, HAARETZ (Sept. 21, 2019),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium.MAGAZINE-howconservative-american-money-helped-the-religious-right-take-over-israel-1.7846235
(“Kohelet’s people are involved in virtually every significant legislative reform
enacted by Netanyahu’s government [ . . . ] Their approach—which sanctifies the
settlements on the one hand, and wild, unfettered markets on the other—has become
bon ton in government circles”).
341
Baum, supra note 265.
342
Id.;
see
AYN
RAND
CENTER
ISRAEL,
About
Us,
https://www.aynrand.org.il/aboutus (last visited May 26, 2020).
343
For example, Ayelet Shaked posted to her Facebook page an excerpt
from an interview with a former Minister of Justice from the major right-wing party
Likud, Dan Meridor. He described his ideology as liberal, adding that for this reason
he had never wanted to appoint conservative judges: “today the struggle is over issues
that in the past were not under dispute.” Shaked’s caption for the excerpt was: “this
is why you always voted for the Right but ended up with the Left.” Ayelet Shaked,
FACEBOOK
(Feb.
3,
2019)
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2428987820487367. See also, Mark, supra
note 272.
344
Guy Ben-Porat & Fany Yuval, Israeli Neo-Conservatism: Rise and Fall?, 22
ISR. STUD. F. 3, 8 (2007); Rynhold, supra note 333, at 199.
339
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internal divisions within the right-wing, putting each of its strands at
odds with at least one of the tenets of conservatism. 345
However, a devout and persistent proponent of American
conservatism has been operating in the Israeli political arena for several
decades: Prime Minister Netanyahu, “an Israeli Republican.”346
Netanyahu has been promoting neo-liberal economic policies as tied
to national freedom and might; holding a hawkish-pragmatic ideology
while employing a friend v. foe rhetoric with regard to Arabs, including
those who are Israeli citizens; appealing to voters’ sense of personal
and national victimhood and existential struggle against universalistic
progressive forces; encouraging a conservative intelligentsia; and has
“repeatedly stated his preference for the presidential system, where the
balance of power is tilted toward the executive branch.”347 Netanyahu
is at home with the American right-wing, and has accordingly turned
for support to “Christian fundamentalists and shrill right-wing Jewish
groups” rather than the established institutions of American Jewish
communities.348 His “lifelong goal” is to replace “Israel’s traditional
elite with one more in tune with his philosophy.”349

Rynhold, supra note 333, at 211–16.
Marc Caputo, “Netanyahu is Essentially an Israeli Republican,” POLITICO
(Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/15/israel-trumpnetanyahu-1465917.
347
DANI FILC, THE POLITICAL RIGHT IN ISRAEL: DIFFERENT FACES OF
JEWISH POPULISM 55–78 (2009); see also Arie Krampf, Israel’s Neoliberal Turn and Its
National Security Paradigm, 47 POLISH POL. SCI. Y.B. 227, 228 (2018); Gayil Talshir,
Populist Rightwing Ideological Exposition: Netanyahu’s Regime as a Case in Point, 8
ADVANCES
APPLIED
PSYCHOL.
329
(2018),
available
at
https://file.scirp.org/pdf/AASoci_2018042415054624.pdf; Ben-Porat & Yuval,
supra note 344; Rynhold, supra note 333, at 203–04, 214. On the link between
conservatism and perceived victimhood, see supra note 184.
348
Jonathan Broder, Netanyahu and American Jews, 15 WORLD POL’Y J. 89, 90
(1998).
349
Aluf Benn, The End of Old Israel, 95 FOREIGN. AFF. 16 (2016). In
Netanyahu’s own words: “Israel is undergoing adjustment pains as it moves from
adolescence to maturity. If initially its governing socialist class wanted to straightjacket all Israelis into one European socialist prototype, they have had a hard time
accepting the fact that this will not happen.” BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, A DURABLE
PEACE: ISRAEL AND ITS PLACE AMONG THE NATIONS xvii (rev. ed. 2000).
345
346
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Netanyahu’s vision is now materializing, although his own
political future is unclear. One manifestation of this success is the
abundant use of the terms conservatism or neo-conservatism to
identify currently rising political and intellectual right-wing forces.350
As a label of political identity, conservatism began its ascendance with
that of Netanyahu in the 1990s, and found the current historical
moment ripe for gaining prominence. Through a younger generation
of political leadership, Netanyahu’s “long-deferred dream of remaking
Israel’s establishment” is coming to fruition.351 It was the year 2019
that marks the first major public conference dedicated to “Israeli
Conservatism.”352
The term “Israeli conservatism” makes clear that the
comparison must be qualified, in the light of the Jewish character of
Israel, the revolutionary and socialist character of Zionism,353 and other
See, e.g., Tomer Persico, The Right is the New Left: Notes on the Current Political
Moment, SHALOM HARTMAN INSTITUTE (Nov. 26, 2017), available at
https://heb.hartman.org.il/Research_And_Comment_View.asp?Article_Id=1379
[Hebrew]; Eric Cohen, Jewish Conservatism: A Manifesto, COMMENTARY (Apr. 2017),
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/jewish-conservatism-manifesto;
Yehuda Vizan, Not Conservatives! Republicans: On the New Hashiloach, 8 DHAK 620
(2017),
available
at
http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/47130e_52dd9b257726479dbde4ca1011bb825f.pdf
[Hebrew]; Akiva Bigman, Is Religious Zionism Conservative?, MIDA (June 4, 2015),
https://en.mida.org.il/2015/06/04/is-religious-zionism-conservative; Dror Eidar,
The Mother of All Disengagements: On the Repression of the Metaphysical in Israeli Cultural
Discourse,
21
AKDAMOT
52,
64
(2008),
available
at
https://www.bmj.org.il/userfiles/akdamot/21/Eider.pdf
[Hebrew];
Simcha
Rothman, Seeds of Change: Surprise HCJ Conservative Ruling, MIDA (June 21, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2wKOG1t [Hebrew]; Shmuel Rosner, How Israel Got Its Supreme Court
Right,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
9,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/opinion/how-israel-got-its-supremecourt-right.html?mcubz=0; Joshua Segev, Justifying Judicial Review: The Changing
Methodology of the Israeli Supreme Court, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
MAKING, supra note 8, at 105, 118–20.
351
Benn, supra note 349, at 22; see also Ben-Porat & Yuval, supra note 344, at
10.
352
THE
ISRAELI
CONSERVATISM
CONFERENCE,
https://conservative.com/en (last visited May 26, 2020).
353
Perhaps taking after the conservative view of the American Revolution
as one “not made, but prevented” (O’Neill, supra note 139, at 305), the new Israeli
conservatism depicts the Zionist movement as dedicated to keep things as they are
350
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variations in culture, history, demographics, political structures, etc.
One major hurdle, however, has been sidestepped by Netanyahu: the
national conflict. Once the occupation of the West Bank354 is
routinized and “managed”355—i.e. deadlock in the peace process
becomes the desirable status quo—this conflict is no longer
experienced as existential. Internal social issues consequently come to
the fore, and there is room for an all-encompassing civil ideology to
crystalize into a coherent political agenda and a compelling intellectual
force.356 Thus, “for the first time [neo-conservatism] has become the
central political axis, disappearing the traditional struggle between right
and left on territorial questions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”357
b.

Moving the Rights Discourse to the Right

The conservative project counters the liberal one, in former
Minister Shaked’s words, by stopping national Zionism from
“continu[ing] to bow down to the system of individual rights

rather than shake them up. See Shaked, supra note 311; Chaim Navon, Age Out of
Socialism, 77 DEOT (Dec. 2016–Jan. 2017), available at https://bit.ly/2I7zhil
[Hebrew].
354
The other area comprising the Palestinian Territories, the Gaza Strip, has
arguably ceased being occupied territory with the “Disengagement Plan” of 2005
(although still effectively controlled by Israel in many respects). See Roi Bachmutsky,
Otherwise Occupied: The Legal Status of the Gaza Strip 50 Years after the Six-Day War, 57
VA. J. INT’L L. 413 (2018); Benjamin Rubin, Disengagement from the Gaza Strip and PostOccupation Duties, 42 ISR. L. REV. 528 (2009).
355
See Orna Ben-Naftali, Michael Sfard & Hedi Viterbo, THE ABC OF THE
OPT: A LEGAL LEXICON OF THE ISRAELI CONTROL OVER THE OCCUPIED
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, 6–17, 362–82, 399–416 and passim (2018); ARIELLA
AZOULAY & ADI OPHIR, THE ONE-STATE CONDITION: OCCUPATION AND
DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE 81 (Tal Haran trans., 2013).
356
Ben-Porat & Yuval, supra note 344, at 15.
357
Erez Tzfadia, The Triumph of Neo-Conservatism, HAOKETS (Jan. 30, 2013),
https://bit.ly/2I63SwK [Hebrew]. For claims that stances toward national-territorial
questions ultimately still determine positions on the political map, see Krampf, supra
note 347; Ilan Saban, The Political Counter-Response to the “Constitutional Revolution,” 13
PUB. SPACE [HAMERHAV HATZIBURI] 13 (2017) [Hebrew]; Kalman Neuman, Indeed
‘Neo-Conservatism’?,
22
AKDAMOT
222
(2009),
https://www.bmj.org.il/userfiles/akdamot/22/Noyman.pdf [Hebrew] (a response
to Eidar, supra note 350).
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interpreted in a universal way.”358 At the same time, Shaked
congratulated her religious constituents for electing her, a secular
woman, thus: “the fact that I was elected to my post in an open primary
shows that ‘Jewish Home’ [her former party] voters are very open and
very liberal.”359 Israeli conservatism walks a tightrope, navigating
between staunch patriotism and the desire to reconfigure institutions,
and between traditional collectivism and the valorization of individual
merit. The utilization and manipulation of the language of rights in
unconventional ways has proven very helpful in this endeavor, at times
directly following American examples.
One such site is relaxing the regulation of private firearm
possession. In August 2018, the Minister of Public Security laxed the
criteria for licenses to keep personal firearm, allowing hundreds of
thousands to become eligible. The reasons given were the potential
contribution to public safety, since these individuals would be able to
ward off terrorist attacks, and also that firearm possession is an
entitlement, necessary for exercising the right to self-protection.360
358
Levi, supra note 265. The biggest triumph of the Right in this regard is
the latest Basic Law enacted in 2018, Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the
Jewish People. For analysis of the law, see Suzie Navot & Yaniv Roznai, From SupraConstitutional Principles to the Misuse of Constituent Power in Israel, 21 EUR. J.L. REFORM
403 (2019). The Basic Law was structured around themes antithetical to Barakian
ones, and has been portrayed as the culmination of the backlash against Barak’s
legacy. MAUTNER, LIBERALISM IN ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 118; Amit Segal, The Rise
and Fall of the Nationality Law, MAKOR RISHON (July 14, 2018),
https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinion/62607/ [Hebrew]. But cf. Jabareen, supra
note 12, at 449 (arguing that this law merely exposes hegemonic Zionism’s exclusion
of Palestinian citizens from “We, the Jewish People,” which has always been
accepted by liberal jurists as well); see also MAUTNER, LIBERALISM IN ISRAEL, supra, at
174–78.
359
Tepperman, supra note 267, at 2.
360
See Ministry of Public Security, As of Today: Graduates of Recon Rifleman 07
Training
are
Eligible
for
Firearm
License
(Aug.
20,
2018),
https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/firearm-license-criteria-expansion-2018
[Hebrew]; Josh Breiner, Erdan Promotes: Hundreds of Thousands More Citizens to Become
Eligible for Firearm Possession Licenses, HAARETZ (July 7, 2018),
https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.6246673 [Hebrew]. There is
currently a petition pending at the Supreme Court against the new regulations. HCJ
8451/18 The Gun on the Kitchen Table v. Minister of Public Security (last checked
May 26, 2020).
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Both aspects signify a privatization of the state’s authority and duty
toward the citizenry, delegating responsibility to the individual. This
expansion followed a surge in demand for freer gun use, framed in the
language of natural rights, as there is no positive anchor in Israeli law
for such a right.361 A growing number of libertarian MKs reiterated,362
some of whom while parroting data provided by gun advocacy interest
groups that draw on the American National Rifle Association.363
Among these MKs is Amir Ohana, who succeeded Shaked as Minister
of Justice (2019–2020). As the first openly gay minister in Israeli
history,364 Ohana, like his predecessor,365 navigates an appreciation of
the liberal rights discourse that allowed him to gain political power,
with an overtly antagonistic approach to the justice system responsible
for it, which he then headed. Described as “represent[ing] the death of
the liberal Israeli Right,”366 Ohana, again like his predecessor, views
this system “not as a moral force but as a competing interest group.”367

361
See Refael Minnes, Carrying Weapon for Self-Defense is a Basic Right, Not a
Privilege, MIDA (March 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/2QDKpEt [Hebrew]; Rodena Golz,
What about the Right to Carry Firearm?, MIDA (Oct. 14, 2013), https://bit.ly/2K8GrFb
[Hebrew]. See also Aviram, supra note 8, at 38.
362
A case in point is MK Amir Ohana, who headed the Knesset’s firearm
policy lobby and pushed for deregulation, and later became Minister of Justice (infra
note 364–367 and accompanying text). Ohana combines libertarianism with extreme
hawkish views, that deem any restraint on the military, such as judicial review, a threat
to national security. The result is that natural rights are really powers allocated to
Jews and withheld from Palestinians. Adam Hakim & Tom Ziv, An Interview with
Amir Ohana: “We Shouldn’t be Shocked by the Idea of Disobeying the Supreme Court,” ZAVIT
AHERET (May 31, 2018), http://www.zavitaheret.com/?p=6450 [Hebrew].
363
See The Whistle, On the Use of Firearm in Domestic Homicides (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.thewhistle.co.il/feed/owxvg9E0V6 [Hebrew] (a fact-check of MK
Ohana, who relied on data provided by the Association for the Promotion of Gun
Culture in Israel); Hod & Levi, supra note 340.
364
See Marcy Oster, Israel Has Its First Gay Government Minister – Netanyahu
Loyalist
Amir
Ohana,
TIMES
OF
ISRAEL
(June
7,
2019),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-has-its-first-gay-government-ministernetanyahu-loyalist-amir-ohana/.
365
Supra text accompanying note 359.
366
Matti Freidman, Amir Ohana Is Gay and Right-Wing. How Far Can He Go in
Israel?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
6,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/opinion/amir-ohana-israel-gay.html.
367
Id.
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Other moves are at once pro-privatization, anti-universalism,
and anti-elitism,368 as part of a traditionalist-libertarian convergence in
religious Zionism circles, which resembles the American Protestant
one.369 A particularly crude example is a prominent Rabbi’s invocation
of J. S. Mill’s harm principle to oppose gay couples adopting children,
claiming children’s freedom is infringed upon when they are deprived
of mothers.370 A more sophisticated argument presented by another
influential Rabbi is that religious Zionism should ‘age out’ of socialism
and embrace free market mechanisms to remedy the “offensive
monopoly of the state” over things like education and welfare. 371 The
Rabbi reasons that the Jewish tradition is one of national unity between
decentralized communities, which encourages non-coerced solidarity:
“thin bureaucracy leaves room for a healthy nation and a strong
society.”372

Specifically, intellectual elitism. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTIINTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1963). On Prime Minister Netanyahu’s selfportrayal as an anti-elitist, see FILC, supra note 347, at 73.
369
See Ravit Hecht, This is How the Right-Wing Converted the Anti-Liberal
Discourse,
HAARETZ
(Aug.
2,
2018),
available
at
https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/the-edge/.premium-1.6337418
[Hebrew];
Houminer, supra note 332; Ram, supra note 326, at 29. On the emergence of a
protestant-like interpretive theology in Israel, see Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “There is
no God, but He Promised Us the Land,” 3 MITAAM 71, 73 (2005), available at
https://library.osu.edu/projects/hebrew-lexicon/99995-files/99995093/9999509303-files/99995093-03-071-076.pdf [Hebrew]; cf. supra note 214.
370
Shlomo Aviner, Babies for Perverts, KIPA (July 23, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2WtzY9q [Hebrew].
371
Navon, supra note 353.
372
Id. It is not clear, however, that economic neo-liberalism is truly the
zeitgeist within religious Zionism. Compare GILAD BE’ERY, THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN RELIGIOSITY AND THE PREFERRED ECONOMIC REGIME IN ISRAEL (2014)
[Hebrew], available at https://www.idi.org.il/books/5166 (finding that overall,
religious people in Israel lean more to socialism and secular people to capitalism),
with Houminer, supra note 332 (arguing that the shift in the religious Zionist elite has
been stark, and its gradual trickling down can be clearly detected). Some polls indicate
that “Shaked’s dog-eat-dog worldview couldn’t be more out of whack with how
much Israelis trust and support the idea of a welfare state.” Hod & Levi, supra note
340. Yet the same authors also mention that “the religious right has stood at the
forefront of resistance to every single social justice campaign in Israel—from the
massive protests in the summer of 2011, to the struggle to raise the minimum wage.”
Id. One explanation that has been offered is that this is a pragmatic strategy rather
368
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Spiritual leaders reinterpret Judaism to create American-style
social conservatism interwoven with various other conservative
threads, thus offering a holistic world-view the Right has been
craving.373 Furthermore, this endeavor leads to similar legal initiatives,
such as creating a “right to work” that undermines labor unions,374 and
allowing private businesses to refuse service to LGBT people, as a
matter of religious liberty.375 The picture drawn in these
reconceptualized culture wars clearly suffers from lack of originality. It
depicts a zero-sum game between PC culture on one side, tradition,
common sense, and freedom on the other side. 376 It is also a rights
discourse that works for the powerful and is not universal, as it
embraces the principle of a natural hierarchy between people, and
bows down to national might.377 At the bottom of both axes are
Palestinians, the subjugation of whose interests to those of the Jewish
than an ideological stance: doubling down on the ideas that resonate in the secular
elite would facilitate the rise of religious people into positions of power. Yair Sheleg,
Srugim Bordering on the Bourgeoisie, 53 DEOT (Oct. 2011), available at
https://bit.ly/2IZefSz [Hebrew]. Another explanation focuses not on whether a
welfare state, but for whom: religious communities are concerned that social welfare
demands would lead to a divestment of resources from West Bank settlements to
low socio-economic groups within Israel. Uri Ram & Dani Filc, Daphni Leef’s July
14th: The Rise and Fall of the Social Justice Protest, 41 THEORY & CRITICISM 17, 23–24
(2013) [Hebrew].
373
Rami Hod & Aviad Houminer, Freedom as Explained by Smotrich, HAARETZ
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.6547540
[Hebrew]; Nitzan Horowitz, Mass School Shootings? Soon in Israel, HAARETZ (Sept. 2,
2018), https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.6434424 [Hebrew]; Hecht,
supra note 369.
374
Ayelet
Shaked,
FACEBOOK
(Aug.
5,
2019),
https://www.facebook.com/ayelet.benshaul.shaked/posts/2275277012590712; see
also Hod & Levi, supra note 340. On the American origins of the concept, see Cynthia
Estlund, How the Workplace Ties Liberals and Conservatives in Knots, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1137
(2015) (book review).
375
103FM, Smotrich: “Encouraging Single-Sex Families Ruins Society,” MAARIV
(July 2, 2018), https://www.maariv.co.il/news/politics/Article-648425 [Hebrew].
For a positioning of such cases within a broader framework of American
conservatism, see Noa Ben-Asher, Faith-Based Emergency Powers, 41 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 269 (2018).
376
See, e.g., Schvarcz, infra note 330.
377
Hod & Houminer, supra note 373; Horowitz, supra note 373; Shaul Arieli,
Look for the Override Clause in Rabbi Kook, HAARETZ (May 14, 2018),
https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.6078594 [Hebrew].
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collective is justified from nationalist, religious, and economic
perspectives.378
c.

Restraining the (Legal) Administrative State

A crucial component of the American conservative reaction to
legal liberalism is the effort to curtail the administrative state, after it
gained new theoretical prominence thanks to the Legal Process
school.379 A similar development in underway in Israel. Specifically,
various politicians on the Right, including both ministers of justice
discussed above, have embarked in recent years on a fierce campaign
against the powers of government lawyers and legal advisors, who are
career professionals holding non-partisan positions.380 Such efforts
include, but are not limited to, altering appointment processes so that
ministers would have personal control over them,381 and sanctioning
government lawyers for voicing concern over liberal-democratic
principles being jeopardized for populist reasons.382

A case in point is the political movement Zehut [Identity], which
combines a libertarian platform focused on marijuana legalization with religiouslyinformed, ultra-nationalist positions. https://zehut.org.il/zehut-platform/?lang=en
(last visited May 26, 2020). See also supra notes 355, 362.
379
Supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
380
See generally YOAV DOTAN, LAWYERING FOR THE RULE OF LAW:
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER IN ISRAEL (2014).
381
See Mordechai Kremnitzer, Eventually the Attorney General will Also Be a
Political
Appointee,
HAARETZ
(June
24,
2018),
https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.6201465 [Hebrew].
382
Moran Azulay, Tova Tzimuki & Shahar Hay, Shaked Demands Dismissal of
Deputy
AG
over
Criticism
of
Bill,
YNET
(Nov.
8,
2018),
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5392785,00.html. Interestingly, the
remarks made by a deputy Attorney General that caused Shaked to demand her
dismissal, were directed against an instance of both political opposition to the
administrative state, and an abuse of the vocabulary of human rights to garner power
(supra section III.B.3.b). The Minister of Culture proposed a statutory amendment
that would enable her to withdraw funds from cultural institutions that display
‘disloyalty’ to the state, despite meeting the Ministry’s professional criteria, based on
the state’s right to ‘freedom of funding.’ Id.
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The desired model for government attorneys is the American
‘Hired Gun’ one.383 This same model was advanced in a 2019
concurrence by Shaked-appointed Justice Stein. Rejecting as
“silencing” the Court’s established stance that the state should not
defend in court an executive decision which the Attorney General
thinks is illegal, 384 Stein alludes to the promise of returning to an
idealized pre-Barak jurisprudence: “these matters are best handled like
they used to be in the more distant past.”385 Both the Barakian and the
reactionist stances promote a unitary executive branch, but they
diverge on who gets to articulate it—one approach has faith in the
existence of objective legal categories and in the ability of legal
professionals to identify them; the other prefers instead to have legal
decisions made by the same persons who decide on substantive policy.
The latter approach has been particularly appealing to
American conservatives due to its majoritarian and traditionalist
character: “The unitary executive may be linked to majoritarianism
through the Framers’ concern for centralizing public accountability in
the President.”386 Legal and bureaucratic checks on executive power
are now framed in Israel, as they are in the U.S., in conspiratorial
rhetoric, as emanating from the “deep state.”387 While arguments both
for and against the ‘Hired Gun’ model in the U.S. are made by
reference to the executive’s democratic accountability, 388 the executive
is not an elected branch in Israel, yet holds massive sway over the
legislature. This trend can thus be understood in the framework of
383
Michael Asimov & Yoav Dotan, Hired Guns and Ministers of Justice: The Role
of Government Attorneys in the United States and Israel, 49 ISR. L. REV. 3 (2016).
384
Note that in Israel, Minister of Justice and Attorney General are separate
positions: the former is a political figure, the latter is a career lawyer. See NAVOT
2007, supra note 65, at 168–73; FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 237.
385
HCJ 5769/18 Amitai v. Minister of Science and Technology (Mar. 4,
2019),
¶¶
7–11
(Stein,
J.,
concurring)
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
8\690\057\z09&fileName=18057690.Z09&type=4 [Hebrew].
386
Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 127, at 1198.
387
See Doron Nehemia, Don’t be Afraid of the Deep State, HAARETZ (Dec. 23,
2019), https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.8304551 [Hebrew] (on
Israel); Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653
(2018) (on the United States).
388
Asimov & Dotan, supra note 383, at 4–10.
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democratic backsliding. 389 Yet it is no coincidence that it resonates
especially with religious Zionism circles,390 since its rationalization also
connotes multiple tenets of the American conservatism narrative.
Shaked’s top legal aide has provided, also in Hashiloach, the rationale
that government attorneys are wrong to follow an independent
professional ethos because their job is to serve the relevant political
figure as their private client.391 Viewed under this light, it becomes
clearer why Justice Stein found it apt to apply Justice Holmes’s quote
that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market,”392 to powerful politicians
with unlimited media access who make putatively illegal decisions.
Thus, the anti-administrative state strand is merged with substantive
conservative inclinations. Such moves may register as a series of shifts
from rule of law to rule of men, yet their advocates rather ask whose will
ought to rule: whether the policymaker’s or the jurist’s. Justice
Sohlberg wishes the judge to cease being an antagonist to governability
and instead become its ally.393
It is not new to portray elitist legalism as an impediment to
national security. The accusation that lawyers tie soldiers’ hands behind
their backs in times of war is well-known, yet continuously reiterated.394
Israel has been in a legal state of emergency ever since its
establishment,395 and executive actions of all kinds are rationalized by
See Nadiv Mordechay & Yaniv Roznai, A Jewish and (Declining) Democratic
State? Constitutional Retrogression in Israel, 77 MD. L. REV. 244 (2017).
390
Yitzhak Gordon, Why Does the Right-Wing Believe Every Conspiracy Theory
Against the Legal System?, MAKOR RISHON (July 4, 2018), available at
https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinion/59975/ [Hebrew].
391
Gil Bringer, The Silent Takeover: From Legal Advisors to “Gatekeepers,” 11
HASHILOACH
75
(2018),
available
at
https://hashiloach.org.il/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/hashiloach-11d790d797d7a8d795d79fd79cd793d7a4d795d7a1.pdf [Hebrew].
392
Amitai, supra note 385, ¶ 10 (Stein, J., concurring).
393
Sohlberg, On Subjective Values, supra note 63, at 39.
394
See, e.g., Mark, supra note 272, at 22.
395
See HCJ 3091/99 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset (May
8,
2012),
available
at
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\9
9\910\030\t38&fileName=99030910_t38.txt&type=4 [Hebrew]; Yoav Mehozay,
The Fluid Jurisprudence of Israel’s Emergency Powers: Legal Patchwork as a Governing Norm,
46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 137 (2012).
389

464

2020

Rise of American Conservatism in Israel

8:2

linkage to the war effort.396 What is new is that now the operation of
the government itself is also a matter of market efficiency.397 Executive
control over legal and administrative professionals—and most of all
those who belong to both categories—is thus necessary. First, for
defending inside cohesion against outside enemies. Second, for
reducing invisible hand frictions. Third, because curtailing government
jurists helps to justify the curtailment of judicial ones, as judicial
deference to the executive branch is justified by the latter having
democratic legitimacy to carry out chosen policy.398
4. Between Law and Politics: Judicial Outcomes
Political questions often transform into adjudicative ones, and
vice versa.399 The dialectic between these two public spheres varies
across time and place and takes different shapes within different
cultural frameworks. In Israel, scholars have portrayed a narrative
according to which an important political function fulfilled by the
Barak Court, PI included, has been the preservation of power in the
hands of a particular social group, in the face of multiculturalism.
According to Menachem Mautner, Ran Hirschl, and others, a secularliberal former hegemony took to the Court in response to the rightwing political ascendance since the late 1970s, 400 turning the judiciary
into a vehicle of liberal policy-making in spite of popular will, a weapon
in the culture wars.401 In religious and nationalist groups especially,

See Netanyahu, supra note 314.
Former mayor of Jerusalem, MK Nir Barkat, has made this proposition
straightforwardly, advocating treating constituents as customers and governing
according to the market principle of supply and demand. Barkat, supra note 330. See
also Ram, supra note 326.
398
See Yariv Levin, Control of the State has Moved from the People to a Handful of
Judges, 211 HAUMA (2018) available at https://bit.ly/2F1LZNN [Hebrew].
399
See John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 41, 42 (2002).
400
The right-wing party Likud first won the general elections in 1977 (one
year before Barak’s appointment to the Supreme Court), after thirty years of Labor
rule.
401
MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL, supra note 270, at 90–
158 (on PI, at 93–94); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARD JURISTOCRACY : THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 50–65 (2007). For a more
generous description of Barak’s jurisprudential enterprise, still along roughly the
396
397

465

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:2

Barak’s Constitutional Revolution is understood as a usurpation of the
constitutional framework for the benefit of one side on the political
map, inadvertently consolidating those communities that oppose the
liberal project.402 Notwithstanding other intra-Israeli as well as global
processes that may add important explanations for this turn in Israeli
jurisprudence,403 it is generally accepted that the Court has since
become a stronghold of political liberalism, implemented by means of
interpretation and construction doctrines.404 One of the problems this
entails is that the gap between the judiciary and the public is constantly
broadening, while in politics, the liberal camp has been unable to
present a compelling agenda that would return it to power.405 Under
this light, the rise of PO is anything but surprising.
The Barak Court hindered the rise of an intellectual
conservative movement, but it could not do so forever and much less
once Barak himself retired and the intellectual stature of the Court
subsided. The conservative attack, starting with former incarnations of
groups described above, is one of the factors Mautner mentions to
explain the Court’s crisis of legitimacy in the late twentieth century.
Their proposed reforms of the judiciary were among those
implemented by former Ministers of Justice whose footsteps Ministers

same lines in terms of social conditions and consequences but according a higher
level of liberal integrity to Barak, see Michelman, supra note 61.
402
Mautner, Protection of Liberal Rights, supra note 14, at 144–46.
403
See Weiler & Lustig, supra note 58, at 476–80 (on global factors); NIR
KEDAR, BLUE AND WHITE LAW: IDENTITY AND LAW IN ISRAEL, A CENTURY-LONG
POLEMIC 146–67 (2017) [Hebrew] (same); Moshe Halbertal, Israel’s Supreme Court and
the Transformation of Israeli Society, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1111 (2013) (on local factors);
Gad Barzilai, The Supreme Court in Israeli Legal Culture, 152 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 193 (1997)
(same). Another important explanation, which both Mautner and Hirschl discuss, is
the neo-liberalization of Israeli economy. See supra note 314.
404
See MEYDANI, supra note 264, at 94–105, 116–20. For claims that behind
the façade of liberalism and protection of human rights there is actually an
acquiescence in and legitimation of oppressive policies, at least with respect to the
Palestinian population, see Jabareen, supra note 12; DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL
STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL (1990); Ronen Shamir, “Landmark Cases” and the
Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel’s High Court of Justice, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV.
781 (1990).
405
MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL, supra note 270, at 159–
80.
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Shaked and Ohana followed.406 But never before have political, civil
and intellectual forces effectively coalesced to provide solid backup for
such efforts. The nexus between these conditions and PO is fourfold:
the new theory is legitimized by these circumstances; it reflects them;
it shares their values; and it may thrive thanks to them.
In the United States around the 1980s, not only did a
comprehensive conservative political force form and not only was it
joined by a judicial one, but also—this cooperation was successful.
Conservative jurisprudence made conservative politicians happy.407
PO’s deliverance should similarly be measured in terms of political
outcomes on top of judicial methodology. We have already seen how
in Israel too, a conservative judiciary can yield conservative results, or
gratifying dissents and concurrences.408 But the role of interpretive
methodology in most of these cases was not significant. The new
theory has only been implemented in a handful of decisions, only one
of which leading to an authoritative result that itself awaits
reevaluation.409 In these cases, PO exemplifies the inner dilemmas of
Israeli-American conservatism more than their resolutions: between
religious interests and those of the free market; localization and
majoritarianism; public virtue and personal responsibility.
PO is as yet on the margins and hence it is difficult to assess
its long-term effects. Note, however, that in both Gini and Rom, two
different Presidents of the Court found it paramount to subject the
legal reasoning presented to heightened judicial scrutiny, by ordering
“further hearing” procedures.410 The disruptive potential of PO within
the Court is thus well recognized, as it should be. Looking forward,
PO is compatible with Israeli conservative politics in at least four
important ways, which defy the trajectory of PI.
First, the focus on law and religion issues positions PO against
both judicial activism and social progressivism at the same time, since

406
407
408
409
410

Id. at 169–70.
Supra notes 155–167 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 283–297 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 62–81 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 62, 76.
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the Supreme Court has been particularly active with respect to ‘the
status quo.’411
Second, PO’s originalist element allows a containment of
rights, a difficult task to achieve with any evolutionary theory. Vaguely
worded bills of rights inevitably get broadened over time but rarely
narrowed down, unless past settlements have conclusive normative
force.412 Sohlberg has doubted the centrality of rights to Israeli
jurisprudence when he called for the enactment of a ‘Basic Law:
Human Responsibility.’ Responsibility is a concept utilized by
American conservatism, but which also has particular Jewish
resonance.413 Such a Basic Law would, in Justice Sohlberg’s opinion,
reintroduce the values that governed the Israeli public sphere before
the rights discourse took over, cherishing social justice, fraternity, and
“restoration of original splendor.”414 This seems to orient toward a
civic republican rather than atomistic social vision, centered around a
conception of the common good, which was indeed prevalent at
Israel’s founding.415

See Adam S. Kramarow, Synagogue and State: Bringing Balance to the Role of
Religion in Israeli Law, 23 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 160 (2013–2014); see also
Barak-Erez, Law and Religion, supra note 234 (showing how ‘the status quo’ has
actually been undergoing constant change, mostly generated through litigation rather
than legislation).
412
Scalia, Originalism, supra note 208, at 855 (“why, one may reasonably ask—
once the original import of the Constitution is cast aside to be replaced by the
‘fundamental values’ of the current society—why are we invited only to ‘expand on’
freedoms, and not to contract them as well?”).
413
Sohlberg, Keep the Law, supra note 247. On responsibility in American
Conservatism, see Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in
Philosophy and Politics, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299 (1992); West, supra note 149, at 716.
On responsibility in Jewish jurisprudence, see Robert Cover, Obligation: A Jewish
Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65 (1987).
414
Sohlberg, Keep the Law, supra note 247, at 26–29.
415
Israel’s founder, David Ben-Gurion, held a republican conception of
citizenship, which led him to oppose the adoption of a bill of rights and focus instead
on individual duties. Doron Navot & Yoav Peled, Toward a Constitutional CounterRevolution in Israel?, 16 CONSTELLATIONS 429, 432 (2009).
411
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Third, a rhetoric of clear cuts and decisiveness is abundant in
political conservatism with respect to issues like the Occupation416 or
separation of powers.417 PO joins this trend,418 adding to it the
decisionism of originalism. Status quo and victory are both acceptable
options—compromise not so much.419 Compromise is, however, what
PI enshrines to facilitate its methodic and substantive liberalism.
Barak’s judicial rhetoric frequently portrays his way as the middle
ground between two extremes, and coupled with the inclusiveness of
his method,420 it creates “a position that never needs to explicitly
determine questions of ideology [ . . . ] ‘balance of interest’ becomes
almost synonymous with ‘adjudication.’”421
Fourth, legislative history provides judges with an avenue for
instilling non-liberal interpretive principles with authority.422
Bezalel Smotrich, Israel’s Decisive Plan, 6 HASHILOACH 81 (2017), available
at
https://hashiloach.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2-3-hashiloach-6smotrich-web.pdf, English translation available at https://hashiloach.org.il/israelsdecisive-plan/.
417
While using the vocabulary of the occupation. Former Minister of
Defense, Naftali Bennett, advocated the enactment of an ‘override clause’ that would
enable the Knesset to re-enact a statute that has been struck down by the Supreme
Court. He claimed this would erect a much-needed “separation wall” between
branches of government, alluding to the wall erected between Israel and the West
Bank. Shahar Hay, Knesset Committee Approves Override Power over High Court, YNET
(June 5, 2018), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5252771,00.html. See
also, on the proposal and its connection to the occupation, Arieli, supra note 377.
418
Similar trends can be detected in American conservative jurisprudence as
well. See, e.g., FRANKS, supra note 183; Jeannie Suk Gersen, How Fetal Personhood
Emerged as the Next Stage of the Abortion Wars, NEW YORKER (June 5, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/how-fetal-personhoodemerged-as-the-next-stage-of-the-abortion-wars (“The abortion fight we are gearing
up for departs from the realm of uneasy compromise and reëngages [sic] the clash of
absolutes”).
419
And hence the tension between the desired resolution for the occupation
and its routinization (supra note 355 and accompanying text), is reconcilable.
420
Supra text accompanying note 249.
421
Amit, supra note 23, at 103.
422
This is already taking place. A district court cited Sohlberg’s approach in
a 2018 intellectual property case, in order to legitimize an interpretive appeal to
Jewish Law, since it served as “one of the sources for the law” as discerned from
pre-enactment legislative activity. CC (Jer) 55503-09-14 Cohen v. Ofer (Sept. 7,
2018), ¶ 897.
416
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Interpreting a given provision of Israeli law so as to bring to fruition
the values of the entire legal system, as PI requires, would give
precedence to liberal values, since they are embedded in the common
law system inherited from the British rule. On the other hand, the
values of the legislature in a given point in time, may have a more
religious or nationalistic flavor. The legislative as well as the executive
branches are concerned with promoting a national project and with
pursuing short-sighted political gains, whereas an essential role of the
judiciary, at least at common law and definitely in Israel ever since its
founding, is to safeguard individual rights and project liberal values
unto society.423
This pivotal historical moment in Israeli jurisprudence has
produced an avenue for the Court to address a shift in public discourse
and public attitudes toward it, fill the vacuum in non-liberal
jurisprudence, and possibly regain some of the public trust it has lost.
But not without considerable costs, for the Israeli public and for the
Court itself. An unfortunate result of the American interpretive dispute
is an entrenchment of two opposing judicial camps, which correlate
those on the political map. This is a corollary of the demand for
methodological purism, and calls for non-absolutist approaches are
growing in the U.S.424 PI attempts to provide that, employing various
interpretive mechanisms in ostensible harmony, while PO builds on
divisions. Coupled with the growing political tendency to divide judges
into two camps, the Israeli Court may consequently become more
polarized and politically tainted. If Justice Sohlberg stays true to the
values represented by PO and remains consistent—for a pick and
choose approach would encounter the same pitfalls from which he
wants to salvage the Court—then judicial integrity may be enhanced,
but judicial independence weakened.

423
Mautner, Protection of Liberal Rights, supra note 14, at 146–48; MAUTNER,
LIBERALISM IN ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 25–27. In this sense, the common law
tradition reconciles liberalism and conservatism.
424
See Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Foreword: Rights as
Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018); FALLON, supra note 174, at 142–54; Solum,
Originalism, supra note 186, at 1282–88; Whittington, Originalism, supra note 161, at
388.
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I doubt that the future holds such polarization for the Israeli
Supreme Court. The trajectory of the interpretation-ideology nexus in
Israel hinges on two related questions: what traction PO and similar
views will gain, and how the liberal wing will respond. One possible
liberal strategy would be to develop—rather than reiterate—PI,
perhaps by breaking the U.S.-inspired cycle and appealing to the local.
A fruitful avenue might be to reclaim the evolving tradition of Jewish
Law,425 another would be to develop a more inclusive localized
philosophy.426 A different strategy would be to view PO as already the
Court’s way to adapt to changes in the political climate. Due to factors
like the relatively uniform ethos of the judiciary and the judges’ powers
in the appointment process,427 the interpretive dispute might lead to a
stronger judiciary. For the mere existence of a conservative minority
that is intrinsic to the Court, can provide it with a veneer of pluralism.
It would allow the Court to mitigate public criticism by occasionally
extending a pound of flesh, in the form of a conservative victory, while
retaining an overall liberal approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
Contrary to recent scholarship on non-American
originalism,428 this Article has told the story of a new originalist method
that follows the same patterns of the American original, playing a role
in a bigger conservative political project. I have argued that the current
historical moment in Israeli jurisprudence marks a recreation of the
dynamics that permeate the American discourse ever since the 1980s,
For such a proposal, see Menachem Mautner, The Supreme Court – Three
Phases: “Alienation”, “Confrontation”, “Containment,” 10 L. & BUS. [MISHPAT VEASAKIM]
585, 596–98 (2009) [Hebrew]. For general discussion of Jewish Law interpretive
methodology vis-à-vis modern ones, see Sapir, supra note 12; Symposium: Text,
Tradition, and Reason in Comparative Perspective, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2006); Samuel
L. Levine, Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert Cover’s Nomos and Narrative, 1998
UTAH L. REV. 465; HALBERTAL, supra note 321.
426
See KEDAR, supra note 403, at 186–210 (arguing that keeping a successful,
evolving Jewish tradition in Israeli law does not depend on incorporating elements
of Jewish Law into it, but rather continuing to develop the already independent and
unique Israeli Law).
427
Supra notes 273–280 and accompanying text.
428
Supra note 6.
425
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with a conservative backlash to a legal liberalism hegemony. In both
countries, a judicial faith in liberal democracy produced progressive
social outcomes via a teleological interpretive method. Subsequently, a
massive political project rendered liberalism synonymous with leftwing and conservatism synonymous with right-wing. This occurs when
social traditionalism, neo-liberal economic policy, and hawkish
national security stances join hands with judicial interpretive methods
centered around originalism, formalism, and deference. This
framework thus offers an alternative explanation—more theoretically
coherent though perhaps no less troubling—to local manifestations of
populism and democratic decline. Despite significant constitutional
and cultural variations, American conservatism can be, and is in fact,
reproduced in other countries as well.
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